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Abstract. The Web Ontology Language OWL is currently the most prominent formalism for representing ontologies
in Semantic Web applications. OWL is based on description logics, and automated reasoners are used to infer
knowledge implicitly present in OWL ontologies. However, because typical description logics obey the classical
principle of explosion, reasoning over inconsistent ontologies is impossible in OWL. This is so despite the fact
that inconsistencies are bound to occur in many realistic cases, e.g., when multiple ontologies are merged or when
ontologies are created by machine learning or data mining tools.
In this paper, we present four-valued paraconsistent description logics which can reason over inconsistencies.
We focus on logics corresponding to OWL DL and its profiles. We present the logic SROIQ4, showing that it is
both sound relative to classical SROIQ and that its embedding into SROIQ is consequence preserving. We also
examine paraconsistent varieties of EL++, DL-Lite, and Horn-DLs. The general framework described here has the
distinct advantage of allowing classical reasoners to draw sound but nontrivial conclusions from even inconsistent
knowledge bases. Truth-value gaps and gluts can also be selectively eliminated from models (by inserting additional
axioms into knowledge bases). If gaps but not gluts are eliminated, additional classical conclusions can be drawn
without affecting paraconsistency.
Keywords: Web Ontology Language, OWL, Description Logic, Paraconsistency, Semantic Web, Complexity,
Automated Deduction
1. Introduction
The Semantic Web is based fundamentally on
the idea that the usefulness of data on the Web can
be significantly increased by publishing it together
with corresponding metadata, the latter giving a
formal and machine processable account of the
data’s meaning [31,32]. The Web Ontology Lan-
guage [30] OWL, now a W3C recommended stan-
dard, specifies this metadata using ontologies—
logical knowledge bases that precisely describe a
given domain of interest.
OWL is closely related to description logics
(DLs). Specifically, OWL DL corresponds to the
description logic SROIQ [34], while the profiles
OWL EL, OWL QL and OWL RL [57] correspond
to the DLs EL++ [8], DL-LiteR [12], and DLP [28],
respectively. The formal semantics of OWL, which
*Corresponding Author
gives meaning to OWL knowledge bases and deter-
mines their logical consequences, is based on DL
semantics, and the automated tools used to reason
over OWL knowledge bases are typically based on
algorithms developed for description logics.
Standard description logics are in turn closely
related to classical first-order logic [31]. In par-
ticular, they have a set-theoretic semantics that
espouses the law of noncontradiction (no state-
ment can be simultaneously true and false), and
the DL account of logical entailment is essentially
the same as classical logic’s: A set K of statements
entails a statement P if and only if there is no in-
terpretation making all of the members of K true
and P false.
A result of this is that the formal semantics of
standard description logics is rendered useless in
the presence of contradictory information. Since
the statements of an inconsistent knowledge base
cannot simultaneously be true, everything is en-
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tailed by them. This is called the principle of ex-
plosion.
If K |= P and K |= ¬P, then K |= Q for all Q.
For any statement P and its negation ¬P, and
any set of statements K, if both P and ¬P are
entailed by K, then all statements Q are also en-
tailed by K. The principle holds in all standard
description logics, and it means that these logics
cannot be used to reason over inconsistencies. In
Popper’s words, “A theory which adds to every
information which it asserts also the negation of
this information can give us no information at all”
[61].
If inconsistencies were rare or could be eas-
ily identified, then this problem would be unin-
teresting. However, real knowledge bases are dis-
tributed and multi-authored, or created using in-
ductive methods or by merging other knowledge
bases, and it is unreasonable to expect them to be
logically consistent all of the time. Furthermore,
it is well known that ascertaining consistency in
expressive formal systems is quite difficult (some-
times impossible).
And so it is important to develop ways of deal-
ing with inconsistencies. One method of doing this
is to maintain the principle of explosion, treat-
ing inconsistencies as errors to be repaired (e.g.,
by rejecting or modifying statements until consis-
tency is restored) [39,66]. This approach has the
virtue of allowing classical logic to be used, al-
beit over an altered set of statements. However, in
addition to the difficulty of determining whether
or not a knowledge base is inconsistent (and also
of pinpointing the sources of inconsistencies), the
approach has the drawback of deleting or modi-
fying some subset of statements. This necessarily
removes valuable information.
An alternative solution is to reject the princi-
ple of explosion itself, employing a so-called para-
consistent logic, i.e., a logic in which inconsisten-
cies do not entail everything. Using one, classically
sound and informative consequences can be drawn
from inconsistent knowledge bases.
The paraconsistency approach is the one taken
here. Extending results found in a collection of
papers [47,48,49,50,51], we present 4-valued para-
consistent semantics for selected DLs and show
how knowledge bases under the 4-valued seman-
tics can be embedded (i.e. translated) into corre-
sponding knowledge bases under classical DL se-
mantics. The virtue of the approach is that the em-
bedding allows existing classical reasoners to draw
inferences according to the new semantics (which,
again, are classically sound).
We focus on the logic SROIQ4, the paraconsis-
tent variant of SROIQ. We prove that SROIQ4
is sound wrt SROIQ and so can be used to cor-
rectly reason over SROIQ knowledge bases. We
also show that the embedding of SROIQ4 into
SROIQ is consequence preserving: a statement is
entailed in SROIQ4 if and only if its translation
is entailed in SROIQ. Furthermore, we show that
by adding axioms of a special type, the law of non-
contradiction and the law of the excluded middle
can be selectively enforced in SROIQ4 knowledge
bases. This allows one to draw further classically
correct conclusions while at the same time (and
with certain caveats) maintaining paraconsistency.
We also apply the paraconsistent framework to
several varieties of tractable description logic, in-
cluding Horn-DLs [43], logics in the DL-Lite fam-
ily, EL++, and the tractable rule language ELP
[44]. As with SROIQ, the paraconsistent varieties
of these can be embedded into their classical coun-
terparts. In order to ensure tractability, however,
restrictions must be specified in each case.
Importantly, we also point out a limitation
of the paraconsistent framework described here.
Specifically, while many DL constructs do not af-
fect paraconsistency one way or another, the in-
teraction of nominals and cardinality restrictions
prevents some knowledge bases from having four-
valued models. For these, the principle of explosion
still applies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows: Section 2 gives a brief overview of multival-
ued logics and of the difficulties (such as the fail-
ure of Modus Ponens) encountered in the 4-valued
context. The implication operators (material, in-
ternal, and strong) forming the basis for concept
inclusion in SROIQ4 are also presented. The syn-
tax and semantics for SROIQ4 are defined in Sec-
tion 3, and SROIQ4 is shown to be sound relative
to SROIQ. Section 4 discusses removing truth
value gaps and gluts from SROIQ4 by adding
further axioms. The embedding of SROIQ4 into
SROIQ is given in Section 5, as are the theo-
rems asserting that the embedding is consequence
preserving. Section 6 shows how the interaction of
nominals and cardinality restrictions causes para-
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consistency to break down. Sections 7 and 8 dis-
cuss embedding tractable logics into their classical
counterparts. It is shown there that tractability is
lost if translations are based on strong or mate-
rial inclusion. A series of empirical tests on OWL
ontologies is described in Section 9. Although the
experiments are limited and of a tentative nature,
their results reinforce the theoretical results of ear-
lier sections: efficient reasoning performance can
be obtained if internal inclusion is used, but typ-
ically not if material or strong inclusion is used.
Section 10 discusses related work.
Proofs for results not reported elsewhere are in-
cluded in the Appendix.
Acknowledgements: This work is a longer version
of materials appearing in [46] and [53], which are
in turn based upon earlier research [47,48,49,50,
51]. The current work was performed while the
first coauthor was a postdoctoral fellow at the
Florida Institute for Human and Machine Cogni-
tion, and later while at Wright State University.
The work was partially supported by the National
Science Foundation under award 10172225 “III:
Small: TROn—Tractable Reasoning with Ontolo-
gies,” and partly realized as part of the Quaero
Programme, funded by OSEO, the French state
agency for innovation.
2. Multivalued Paraconsistent Logics
A logic is paraconsistent if the principle of ex-
plosion fails in at least one case, that is if there
exist statements P and Q, and a set of statements
K, such that K |= P and K |= ¬P but K 6|= Q.
Classical logic fails to be paraconsistent because
no set entailing P and ¬P possesses a model. In
the 4-valued logics upon which SROIQ4 is based,
paraconsistency is achieved essentially by redefin-
ing what “interpretation” and “model” mean, so
that classically inconsistent sets can have models.
We will briefly discuss multivalued paraconsis-
tent logics here. The important properties of mul-
tivalued logics can be illustrated with proposi-
tional logics over the usual set of connectives: ¬
(negation), ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (inclusive disjunc-
tion), and 7→ (material implication). As such, we’ll
restrict ourselves to discussing these.
An n-valued logic specifies a set V of truth val-
ues, |V | = n, and some subset D ⊆ V of desig-
t
k
n
b
0 1
Fig. 1. Belnap’s Bilattice
nated values. An n-valued interpretation assigns
elements of V to each atomic statement, and the
values of compound statements are defined using
truth-functions. An n-valued model of K is an in-
terpretation where each statement of K is given a
value from D, and K entails P iff every n-valued
model of K is also an n-valued model of P.
In the context of computing, the use of four
truth values {n, 0, 1, b} can be traced to Belnap
[9,10], with the four values corresponding to what
a computer knows or has been told about P: noth-
ing (n); that P is false (0); that P is true (1);
that P is true and that P is false (b). Belnap in-
tended the four values to be treated epistemically.
They correspond to what the computer has been
told about P, rather than denoting an actual truth
value.
The semantics for the logical connectives can
be given using Belnap’s Bilattice (Figure 1). The
truth values are partially ordered according to two
relations: ≤t (the truth ordering), and ≤k (the
knowledge ordering). Both define complete lattices
over the set of truth values. The truth-functions
for ∧ and ∨ are defined as
– v(P ∧Q) = glb≤t(v(P), v(Q))
– v(P ∨Q) = lub≤t(v(P), v(Q))
where glb≤t(x, y) and lub≤t(x, y) refer, respec-
tively, to the greatest lower bound and least upper
bound of x and y in the ≤t-lattice. Negation in-
verts the diagram in the ≤t-ordering. This seman-
tics yields the characteristic truth tables given in
Table 1, where material implication P7→Q is de-
fined as ¬P ∨Q.
The value b is a truth value glut, while n is a
truth value gap. If one allows gluts but not gaps,
then one gets Graham Priest’s 3-valued Logic of
Paradox (LP) [62]. Allowing gaps but not gluts
yields Kleene’s strong 3-valued logic K3 [42]. If one
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Table 1
4-valued semantics for the traditional connectives.
¬
n n
0 1
1 0
b b
∧ n 0 1 b
n n 0 n 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 n 0 1 b
b 0 0 b b
∨ n 0 1 b
n n n 1 1
0 n 0 1 b
1 1 1 1 1
b 1 b 1 b
7→ n 0 1 b
n n n 1 1
0 1 1 1 1
1 n 0 1 b
b 1 b 1 b
allows neither gaps nor gluts, then one is left with
classical logic. Typically, if gluts are allowed in a
logic L and b is designated, then L is paraconsis-
tent. E.g, LP is paraconsistent, while K3 is not.
It should be pointed out that, ceteris paribus,
all of the consequence relations defined using the
multivalued framework possess the following prop-
erties.
– Reflexivity: If P ∈ K, then K |= P.
– Monotonicity: If K |= P, then for all K ′, K ∪
K ′ |= P.
– Transitivity: If K |= P for all P ∈ K ′, and
K ′ |= Q, then K |= Q.
The same holds for all of the paraconsistent de-
scription logics defined in later sections.
Several traditional rules of inference, however,
often do not hold in the 4-valued context. In par-
ticular some involving material implication do not
hold. Because of this, alternative implication op-
erators (symbolized here using  ) have been pro-
posed. Below, P and Q are arbitrary statements,
and K is an arbitrary set of statements.
– Disjunctive Syllogism: If K |= ¬P and K |=
P ∨Q, then K |= Q.
– Modus Ponens: If K |= P  Q and K |= P,
then K |= Q.
– Modus Tollens: If K |= P  Q and K |= ¬Q,
then K |= ¬P.
– Identity: K |= P  P.
– Transposition: If K |= P  Q, then K |=
¬Q ¬P.
– Deduction Theorem: If K ∪ {P} |= Q, then
K |= P  Q.
– Strong Equivalence: For all truth-value as-
signments v, [v(P  Q) ∈ {1, b} and v(Q  
P) ∈ {1, b}] iff v(P) = v(Q).
– Supraclassicality: For all truth-value assign-
ments v, if v(P)∪ v(Q) ⊆ {0, 1}, then v(P  
Q) = v(P7→Q).
Let |=4 indicate the consequence relation de-
fined over the propositional language of ∨, ∧, ¬,
and 7→, and using V = {n, 0, 1, b} and D = {1, b}.
With the exception of Transposition, none of the
above items hold for material implication relative
to |=4. It is in particular the combined failures of
Modus Ponens and the Deduction Theorem that
have led to the development of alternative impli-
cation operators. SROIQ4 and the other descrip-
tion logics described below use operators defined
in the logics of Arieli and Avron [5,6]. The basic
operator (⊃) is called internal implication, while
strong implication (→) is defined in terms of it.
Equivalence (↔) is defined in turn using strong
implication. For any truth-value assignment v, the
semantics for the three are given below.
– v(P ⊃ Q) = 1 if v(P) /∈ {1, b};
v(P ⊃ Q) = v(Q) otherwise.
– v(P → Q) = v((P ⊃ Q) ∧ (¬Q ⊃ ¬P))
– v(P ↔ Q) = v((P → Q) ∧ (Q → P))
The semantics gives rise to the truth tables shown
in Table 2. Internal implication satisfies Modus
Ponens, the Deduction Theorem, Identity, and
Supraclassicality, but not Modus Tollens, Trans-
position or Strong Equivalence. Strong implication
satisfies all of these except (as shown below) the
Deduction Theorem.
Example 1. Let A and P be atomic formulas and
Q = (A ∧ ¬A). Clearly, {Q,P} |=4 Q. However,
an assignment v on which v(A) = b and v(P) = 1
shows {Q} 6|=4 P → Q.
The failure of the Deduction Theorem for strong
implication naturally leads one to ask whether
there are any operators  that satisfy Modus
Ponens, Identity, Supraclassicality, Transposition,
Modus Tollens, and Strong Equivalence, but also
the Deduction Theorem. This is not the case.
Proposition 2. If  satisfies Modus Ponens and
the Deduction Theorem, then  satisfies none of
Modus Tollens, Strong Equivalence, or Transposi-
tion.
The above proposition holds whether or not
Supraclassicality or Identity is satisfied.
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Table 2
Truth tables for internal implication, strong implication, and equivalence.
⊃ n 0 1 b
n 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1
1 n 0 1 b
b n 0 1 b
→ n 0 1 b
n 1 n 1 n
0 1 1 1 1
1 n 0 1 0
b n 0 1 b
↔ n 0 1 b
n 1 n n n
0 n 1 0 0
1 n 0 1 0
b n 0 0 b
Since strong implication satisfies Strong Equiv-
alence, P ↔ Q is a tautology iff the values of P
and Q coincide in every interpretation. The anal-
ogous claim does not hold if equivalence were to
be spelled out using ⊃.
3. SROIQ and SROIQ4
The syntax and semantics for classical SROIQ
are given in Table 3. Below, NC , NR, and NI are
disjoint sets of atomic concept names, atomic role
names, and individual names. Well-formed formu-
las are created from them, together with the con-
nectives ¬, u, unionsq, etc., and punctuation symbols. A
SROIQ knowledge base is the union of a TBox,
RBox, and ABox, defined below. The original pre-
sentation of SROIQ is found in [34].
Definition 3. The set of SROIQ role descriptions
is NR ∪ N−R , where N−R = {R−|R ∈ NR}. R and
R− are inverses of each other. NR contains a uni-
versal role U .
Definition 4. R1 ◦ . . . ◦ Rn v R, where n ≥ 1 and
R,Ri ∈ NR∪N−R , is a role-inclusion axiom (RIA).
A role-hierarchy is a finite set of RIAs.
Above, an expression such as R1 ◦ . . . ◦ Rn is
used to denote a composition of roles. A role R is
simple if it: 1) does not appear on the right-hand
side of an RIA; 2) is the inverse of a simple role;
or 3) appears in the right-hand side of an RIA
only if the left-hand side consists entirely of simple
roles. Simplicity is needed to ensure decidability
of SROIQ.
Definition 5. Ref(R), Irr(R), and Dis(R,S),
where R and S are roles other than U , are role
assertions. A set of role assertions is simple wrt
role-hierarchy H if each assertion Irr(R) and
Dis(R,S) uses only roles that are simple wrt H.
Ref , Irr, and Dis are used to specify that a
role is reflexive, irreflexive, or disjoint with another
role. Sym and Trans may be used to express sym-
metry and transitivity, but since they can be en-
coded via other means, we will not discuss them.
Decidability also requires the role hierarchy to
be regular.
Definition 6. A strict partial order ≺ on NR∪N−R
is a regular order iff the following holds for all
roles R and S: S ≺ R iff S− ≺ R.
Definition 7. Let ≺ be a regular order on roles. An
RIA w v R is ≺-regular iff R ∈ RN and w has
one of the below forms.
1. R ◦R
2. R−
3. S1 ◦ . . . ◦ Sn, where each Si ≺ R
4. R ◦ S1 ◦ . . . ◦ Sn, where each Si ≺ R
5. S1 ◦ . . . ◦ Sn ◦R, where each Si ≺ R
A role hierarchy H is regular if there exists a regu-
lar order ≺ such that each RIA in H is ≺-regular.
Definition 8. An RBox is a finite, regular role hi-
erarchy H together with a finite set of role asser-
tions simple wrt H.
Definition 9. If a1, . . . , an are in NI , then {a1, . . .,
an} is a nominal. No is the set of nominals.
Definition 10. The set of SROIQ-concept de-
scriptions is the smallest set such that:
1. ⊥, >, each C ∈ NC , and each o ∈ No is a
concept description.
2. If C is a concept description, then ¬C is a
concept description.
3. If C and D are concept descriptions, R is a
role description, S is a simple role descrip-
tion, and n is a nonnegative integer, then the
following are all concept descriptions:
(C uD), (C unionsqD), ∃R.C, ∀R.C,
≤ nS.C, ≥ nS.C, ∃S.Self .
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Table 3
Syntax and semantics of SROIQ.
Concept Syntax SROIQ Semantics
atomic
C ∈ NC CI ⊆ ∆I
concept
individual a ∈ NI aI ∈ ∆I
nominal {a1, . . . , an}, ai ∈ NI {aI1 , . . . , aIn}
role R ∈ NR RI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I
inverse role R−, R ∈ NR R−I = {(y, x)|(x, y) ∈ RI}
universal role U UI = ∆I ×∆I
role
R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn {(x, z)|(x, y1) ∈ R
I
1 ∧ (y1, y2) ∈ RI2 ∧ . . .
composition . . . ∧ (yn, z) ∈ RIn}
top > >I = ∆I
bottom ⊥ ⊥I = ∅
negation ¬C (¬C)I = ∆I/CI
conjunction C1 u C2 (C1 u C2)I = CI1 ∩ CI2
disjunction C1 unionsq C2 (C1 unionsq C2)I = CI1 ∪ CI2
exists ∃R.C {x|(∃y)[(x, y) ∈ RI ∧ y ∈ CI ]}
restriction
value ∀R.C {x|(∀y)([(x, y) ∈ RI 7→y ∈ CI ]}
restriction
self ∃R.Self {x|(x, x) ∈ RI}
restriction
atmost ≤ nR.C {x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ RI ∧ y ∈ CI} ≤ n}
restriction
atleast ≥ nR.C {x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ RI ∧ y ∈ CI} ≥ n}
restriction
Axiom Syntax SROIQ Semantics
concept
C1 v C2 CI1 ⊆ CI2inclusion
role
R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn v Rn+1 (R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn)I ⊆ RIn+1inclusion
reflexivity Ref(R) {(x, x)|x ∈ ∆I} ⊆ RI
irreflexivity Irr(R) {(x, x)|x ∈ ∆I} ∩RI = ∅
disjointness Dis(R,S) SI ∩RI = ∅
class
C(a) aI ∈ CI
assertion
inequality
a 6= b aI 6= bI
assertion
role (instance)
R(a, b) (aI , bI) ∈ RI
assertion
negative role ¬R(a, b) (aI , bI) /∈ RI
assertion
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Definition 11. If C and D are concept descrip-
tions, then C v D is a general concept inclusion
(GCI) axiom. A TBox is a finite set of GCIs.
Definition 12. If C is a concept description, a, b ∈
NI , R,S ∈ NR ∪ N−R , and S is a simple role de-
scription, then C(a), R(a, b), ¬S(a, b), and a 6= b,
are individual assertions. A SROIQ ABox is a
set of individual assertions.
We will call all GCIs, RIAs, role assertions, and
individual assertions, axioms.
The semantics of SROIQ is classical. A 2-
valued interpretation (or 2-interpretation) is a tu-
ple 〈∆I , ·I〉, where ∆I is a nonempty set (the
universe of discourse), and ·I is a valuation func-
tion defined inductively as shown in Table 3. A 2-
interpretation I 2-satisfies (is a 2-model of ) an ax-
iom A if the corresponding condition of SROIQ
in Table 3 is met. I 2-satisfies (is a 2-model of) a
knowledge base KB iff it 2-satisfies each axiom in
KB. KB is 2-satisfiable (2-unsatisfiable) iff it has
(does not have) a 2-model. KB entails an axiom A
wrt SROIQ (KB |=SROIQ A) iff every 2-model
of KB is a 2-model of A.
Since it is classical, SROIQ obeys the principle
of explosion.
Example 13. Let KB be a SROIQ knowledge base
containing the following axioms:
Sedan(c435),
V an(c435),
Sedan v ¬V an,
Incident(i90),
involvedIn(c435 i90),
assignedTo(unit1 i90),
memberOf(tom unit1).
The knowledge base is intended to describe an
accident involving a vehicle, the response team
assigned to the accident, and the members of
the team. The first three axioms are inconsis-
tent, however, and because of this, unintuitive con-
sequences such as memberOf(c435 unit1) and
Incident(tom) are entailed according to the clas-
sical SROIQ semantics.
To create the 4-valued logic SROIQ4, we assign
to each concept description both a positive exten-
sion P and a negative extension (anti-extension)
N . C(a) can thereby take on one of Belnap’s four
values.
1: aI ∈ P , aI /∈ N .
0: aI /∈ P , aI ∈ N .
n: aI /∈ P , aI /∈ N .
b: aI ∈ P , aI ∈ N .
Roles are given a 4-valued semantics as well (in
earlier papers [46], we at times treated them clas-
sically). Specifically, RI is 〈P,N〉, where P and
N are subsets of ∆I × ∆I . The reason for this
treatment is to maintain paraconsistency while al-
lowing Irr, Dis, Ref , ∃R.Self , and negative role
assertions to be used in knowledge bases.
The syntax for SROIQ4 differs from SROIQ
in that it allows three types of inclusion axiom,
based on the operators of Arieli and Avron’s logic.
C1 7→ C2 material inclusion
C1 @ C2 internal inclusion
C1 → C2 strong inclusion
Strictly speaking, axioms using the new inclusion
operators are not defined in classical SROIQ.
However, we choose to extend the SROIQ syn-
tax and semantics, stipulating that (C 7→ D),
(C @ D), and (C → D) have the same seman-
tics in SROIQ as (C v D). We also stipulate
that (C v D) is to be read as (C @ D) in
SROIQ4. This allows a common language L for
both SROIQ and SROIQ4 knowledge bases and
simplifies some of the proofs later in the paper.
If a knowledge base makes use of only v, then
we will call it a SROIQ knowledge base. Other-
wise, it is a SROIQ4 knowledge base. It should
be noted that SROIQ encompasses several other
description logics discussed in the literature. E.g,
ALC is the logic defined using only NC , NR, NI ,
and the connectives u, unionsq, ¬, ∀, and ∃. SHIQ adds
qualified cardinality restrictions.1 As this is so, we
can also speak of ALC4 and SHIQ4 knowledge
bases. The paraconsistent framework defined here
for SROIQ applies equally well to them.
The semantics of SROIQ4 parallels that of
its classical counterpart. A 4-valued interpretation
(4-interpretation) is a tuple 〈∆I , ·I〉, where ∆I is
nonempty and ·I is a valuation function defined
inductively as shown in Table 4. We will also make
use of the following notation: If C is a concept
and I is a 4-interpretation such that CI = 〈P,N〉,
1SHIQ also allows an assertion of the form Trans(R).
However, this can be simulated in SROIQ.
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Table 4
Syntax and semantics of SROIQ4.
Syntax SROIQ4 Semantics
C ∈ NC CI = 〈P,N〉, where P,N ⊆ ∆I
a ∈ NI aI ∈ ∆I
{a1, . . . , an}, ai ∈ NI 〈{aI1 , . . . , aIn}, N〉, where N ⊆ ∆I
R ∈ NR RI = 〈P,N〉, where P,N ⊆ ∆I ×∆I
R−, R ∈ NR
R−I = 〈P−, N−〉, where RI = 〈P,N〉,
P− = {(b, a)|(a, b) ∈ P}, N− = {(b, a)|(a, b) ∈ N}
U UI = 〈∆I ×∆I ,∅〉
R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn 〈{(x,z)|(∃y1...n)[(x,y1) ∈ p
+(RI1 ) ∧ . . . ∧ (yn,z) ∈ p+(RIn ]})
{(x, z)|(∀y1...n)[(x, y1) ∈ p−(RI1 ) ∨ . . . ∨ (yn, z) ∈ p−(RIn ]})〉
> >I = 〈∆I ,∅〉
⊥ ⊥I = 〈∅,∆I〉
¬C (¬C)I = 〈N,P 〉, where CI = 〈P,N〉
C1 u C2 (C1 u C2)I = 〈P1 ∩ P2, N1 ∪N2〉, where CIi = 〈Pi, Ni〉
C1 unionsq C2 (C1 unionsq C2)I = 〈P1 ∪ P2, N1 ∩N2〉, where CIi = 〈Pi, Ni〉
∃R.C 〈{x|(∃y)[(x, y) ∈ p
+(RI ) ∧ y ∈ p+(CI)]},
{x|(∀y)[(x, y) ∈ p+(RI )7→y ∈ p−(CI)]}〉
∀R.C 〈{x|(∀y)([(x, y) ∈ p
+(RI )7→y ∈ p+(CI)]},
{x|(∃y)[(x, y) ∈ p+(RI ) ∧ y ∈ p−(CI)]}〉
∃R.Self 〈{x|(x, x) ∈ p+(RI )}, N〉, N ⊆ ∆I
≤ nR.C 〈{x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ p
+(RI ) ∧ y /∈ p−(CI)} ≤ n},
{x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ p+(RI ) ∧ y ∈ p+(CI)} > n}〉
≥ nR.C 〈{x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ p
+(RI ) ∧ y ∈ p+(CI)} ≥ n},
{x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ p+(RI ) ∧ y /∈ p−(CI)} < n}〉
Syntax SROIQ4 Semantics
C1 7→ C2 (∆I − p−(CI1 )) ⊆ p+(CI2 )
C1 @ C2 p+(CI1 ) ⊆ p+(CI2 )
C1 → C2 p+(CI1 ) ⊆ p+(CI2 ) and p−(CI2 ) ⊆ p−(CI1 )
R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn v Rn+1 p+((R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn)I ) ⊆ p+(RIn+1)
Ref(R) {(x, x)|x ∈ ∆I} ⊆ p+(RI )
Irr(R) {(x, x)|x ∈ ∆I} ⊆ p−(RI )
Dis(R,S) p+(RI ) ⊆ p−(SI) and p+(SI ) ⊆ p−(RI)
C(a) aI ∈ p+(CI)
a 6= b aI 6= bI
R(a, b) (aI , bI) ∈ p+(RI )
¬R(a, b) (aI , bI) ∈ p−(RI )
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then p+(CI) =def P and p−(CI) =def N . A 4-
interpretation 4-satisfies (is a 4-model of ) an ax-
iom A if the corresponding condition of SROIQ4
in Table 4 is met. I 4-satisfies a knowledge base
KB iff it 4-satisfies each axiom in KB. KB is
4-satisfiable (4-unsatisfiable) iff it has (does not
have) a 4-model. KB entails an axiom A wrt
SROIQ4 (KB |=SROIQ4 A) iff every 4-model of
KB is a 4-model of A.
Example 14. The following interpretation is a 4-
model of the knowledge base in Example 13.
∆I = {c435, i90, tom, unit1}
c435I = c435
i90I = i90
tomI = tom
unit1I = unit1
SedanI = V anI = 〈{c435},∆I〉
IncidentI = 〈{i90},∆I − {i90}〉
involvedInI = 〈{(c435, i90)}, (∆I)2 − {(c435, i90)}〉
assignedToI = 〈{(unit1, i90)}, (∆I)2−{(unit1, i90)}〉
memberOfI=〈{(tom, unit1)}, (∆I)2−{(tom, unit1)}〉
The interpretation in Example 14 is a 4-model
regardless of whether the single inclusion axiom
of the knowledge base is read as material inclu-
sion, internal inclusion, or strong inclusion. The
interpretation is not a 4-model of the assertions
Incident(tom) and memberOf(c435, unit1), how-
ever, and so the knowledge base does not entail
them according to SROIQ4.
It should be pointed out that internal inclusion
@ approximates →, in the sense that the conse-
quences obtainable using @ are a subset of those
obtainable using →.
Proposition 15. Let KB be a SROIQ4 knowledge
base, A a SROIQ4 axiom, and KB′ the knowl-
edge base obtained by replacing one or more occur-
rences of @ with →. If KB |= A, then KB′ |= A.
In contrast, material inclusion 7→ does not approx-
imate @ in a similar way.
Example 16. In general, {C 7→ D} |= C 7→ D
holds in SROIQ4 but {C @ D} 6|= C 7→ D does
not. This can be seen by modifying the interpre-
tation in Example 14 so that SedanI and V anI
are defined to be 〈{c435}, {c435}〉. Under the mod-
ified interpretation, Sedan → ¬V an is satisfied
but Sedan 7→ ¬V an is not.
In SROIQ4, inequality assertions a 6= b have
a classical semantics: a 6= b is true if and only if
aI 6= bI , and it is false otherwise. In other words,
we have not given (in)equality a paraconsistent
semantics. This is done to facilitate embedding
SROIQ4 into classical SROIQ so that classical
tools can be used to reason paraconsistently. How-
ever, the use of classical semantics here entails the
existence of SROIQ4 knowledge bases that do not
have 4-valued models. This is discussed in subse-
quent sections.
As in the classical setting, several equivalences
involving negation hold in SROIQ4.
Proposition 17. For any SROIQ4 concepts C, D
and 4-interpretation I the following hold.
1. (¬>)I = ⊥I
2. (¬⊥)I = >I
3. (¬¬C)I = CI
4. (¬(C uD))I = (¬C unionsq ¬D)I
5. (¬(C unionsqD))I = (¬C u ¬D)I
6. (¬∃R.C)I = (∀R.¬C)I
7. (¬∀R.C)I = (∃R.¬C)I
8. (¬ ≤ nR.C)I = (≥ n+ 1R.C)I
9. (¬ ≥ nR.C)I = (≤ n− 1R.C)I
In the classical DL setting, concept C is sub-
sumed by concept D if and only if CI ⊆ DI for
each classical interpretation I, and C and D are
equivalent if and only if CI = DI . These are eas-
ily related to satisfiability of GCIs. Since the se-
mantics for SROIQ4 is 4-valued, distinct notions
of subsumption and equivalence naturally arise.
Definition 18. Let C and D be SROIQ4 concept
descriptions and KB a SROIQ4 knowledge base.
1. C is 4-satisfiable wrt KB if there is a 4-model
I of KB such that p+(CI) is not empty.
2. C is weakly subsumed by D (D weakly sub-
sumes C) wrt KB if p+(CI) ⊆ p+(DI) in
every 4-model I of KB.
3. C is strongly subsumed by D (D strongly
subsumes C) wrt KB if p+(CI) ⊆ p+(DI)
and p−(DI) ⊆ p−(CI) in every 4-model I of
KB.
4. C and D are weakly equivalent (C ≡ D) wrt
KB iff p+(CI) = p+(DI) on each 4-model I
of KB.
5. C and D are strongly equivalent (C ↔ D)
wrt KB iff CI = DI on each 4-model I of
KB.
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In Example 13, V an is 4-satisfiable relative to
the knowledge baseKB defined there, even though
the only models for it assign common elements
to both its positive and negative extensions. Sim-
ilarly, since in every model of KB it holds that
p+(SedanI) ⊆ p+((¬V an)I), regardless of the
model I in question, Sedan is weakly subsumed
by ¬V an. It is not strongly subsumed, however.
For instance, if the interpretation of Example 14 is
modified so that SedanI = 〈{c435}, {c435}〉 but
V anI = 〈∆I , {c435}〉, then KB is still satisfied.
However the criteria for strong subsumption are
not met.
The below sets of claims follow immediately
from Definition 18 and the semantics of SROIQ4.
Proposition 19. Let C and D be SROIQ4 concept
descriptions. The following all hold relative to any
SROIQ4 knowledge base KB.
1. C is 4-unsatisfiable iff C is weakly subsumed
by ⊥.
2. C and D are weakly equivalent iff C weakly
subsumes D and D weakly subsumes C.
3. C and D are strongly equivalent iff C strongly
subsumes D and D strongly subsumes C.
Proposition 20. Let C and D be SROIQ4 concept
descriptions. The following all hold relative to any
SROIQ4 knowledge base KB.
1. C is weakly subsumed by D iff C @ D is sat-
isfied on each I.
2. C is strongly subsumed by D iff C → D is
satisfied on each I.
3. C and D are weakly equivalent iff C @ D and
D @ C are both satisfied on each I.
4. C and D are strongly equivalent iff C → D
and D → C are both satisfied on each I.
3.1. SROIQ4 is Sound
Every 2-interpretation I2 of a knowledge base
KB corresponds to a 4-interpretation I4, which
we will call the 4-counterpart of I2:
– ∆I4 =def ∆I2 .
– For each a ∈ NI , aI4 =def aI2 .
– For each R ∈ NR, RI4 =def 〈RI2 , (∆I2 ×
∆I2)−RI2〉.
– For each C ∈ NC ∪ No, or C = ∃R.Self ,
CI4 =def 〈CI2 ,∆I2 − CI2〉.
Since ∆I4 =def ∆I2 , we will use ∆ to refer to the
common domain of discourse. In the counterpart
I4, the positive and negative extensions of each
atomic concept partition ∆. In fact, this holds for
even non-atomic concept descriptions.
Proposition 21. If I2 is a 2-interpretation and I4
its 4-counterpart, then for any concept description
C, CI4 = 〈CI2 ,∆− CI2〉.
Proposition 22. If I2 is a 2-interpretation and I4
its 4-counterpart, then for any axiom A, I4 is a
4-model of A iff I2 is a 2-model of A.
Given Proposition 22 and the fact that con-
cept inclusion axioms have the same semantics in
SROIQ regardless of their type, the following are
all equivalent:
– I2 is a 2-model of C v D.
– I4 is a 4-model of C @ D.
– I4 is a 4-model of C 7→ D.
– I4 is a 4-model of C → D.
Example 23. Let KB2 be the knowledge base from
Example 13 with the assertion V an(c435) re-
moved. KB2 is classically satisfiable, and we may
define a 2-valued model I2 as follows:
– ∆ = {c435, i90, tom, unit1}
– c435I2 = c435, i90I = i90,
tomI2 = tom, unit1I = unit1
– SedanI2 = {c435}
– V anI2 = ∅
– IncidentI = {i90}
– involvedInI = {(c435, i90)}
– assignedToI = {(unit1, i90)}
– memberOfI = {(tom, unit1)}
The 4-valued counterpart I4 of I2 looks exactly
like the 4-valued interpretation in Example 14,
save that interpretations for V an and Sedan are
as shown below.
– SedanI = 〈{c435},∆I − {c435}〉
– V anI = 〈∅,∆I〉
Given this, (¬V an)I4 is 〈∆I ,∅〉, which is in agree-
ment with Proposition 21. Furthermore, it can be
readily verified that I4 is a 4-model of KB2, in
agreement with Proposition 22.
Proposition 24. Let KB be a SROIQ4 knowledge
base and A a SROIQ4 axiom. If KB |=SROIQ4
A, then KB |=SROIQ A.
Proof. If KB |=SROIQ4 A and I2 2-satisfies KB,
then by Prop. 22 the 4-counterpart I4 of I2 4-
satisfies KB and hence A. Again by Prop. 22, I2
2-satisfies A.
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And so SROIQ4 is sound wrt SROIQ.
Example 25. In Examples 13 and 23, one may
conclude ¬V an(v435) (which follows trivially by
Modus Ponens). In Example 13, one may also
conclude V an(435) (by Reflexivity). In both cases,
these conclusions are sound relative to classical
SROIQ (in Example 13, since KB is classically
inconsistent, everything follows from it).
Significantly, regardless of what inclusion op-
erator is used in SROIQ4, if A is entailed in
SROIQ4, then it is also entailed according to
SROIQ. We can show this by replacing each in-
clusion symbol with v.
Proposition 26. Let KB be a SROIQ4 knowledge
base, A a SROIQ4 axiom, and KB′ and A′ the
SROIQ knowledge base and axiom obtained by
replacing each occurrence of @, 7→, and→ with v.
If KB |=SROIQ4 A, then KB′ |=SROIQ A′
Proof. If KB |=SROIQ4 A and I2 2-satisfies KB′,
then by Prop. 22, the 4-counterpart I4 of I2 4-
satisfies KB′. Furthermore (by Prop. 22), I4 4-
satisfies KB. Since KB |=SROIQ4 A, I4 4-satisfies
A, and so by Prop. 22, I2 2-satisfies A. If A 6=
A′, then A must be a SROIQ4 inclusion axiom,
which by convention has the same semantics in
SROIQ as A′. And so I2 2-satisfies A′.
Example 27. Consider the set KB
{Sedan(c435), V an(c435), Sedan v ¬V an}
of axioms from Example 13. One can conclude
¬V an(c435) but cannot conclude ¬Sedan(c435),
as internal inclusion does not permit Modus Tol-
lens. However, the latter expression does follow if
Sedan @ ¬V an is replaced with Sedan → ¬V an.
In both cases, the conclusions are sound relative
to classical SROIQ, and they would remain so if,
e.g., Sedan(c435) were removed in the second case
to make the knowledge base consistent.
Recall the two accounts of equivalence given ear-
lier. Strong equivalence corresponds most closely
to the classical account, and it is the account used
in Arieli and Avron’s logic. It is often more than
one needs, however, since satisfaction and entail-
ment in SROIQ4 are defined using only the pos-
itive extensions of axioms. E.g.,
{C(a)} |=SROIQ4 D(a) and
{D(a)} |=SROIQ4 C(a)
holds iff C and D are weakly equivalent. Further-
more, because SROIQ4 is sound wrt SROIQ, if
C and D are even weakly equivalent in SROIQ4,
then the concepts are equivalent in classical
SROIQ. Something similar holds for disjointness.
For instance, if
KB |=SROIQ4 C @ ¬D or
KB |=SROIQ4 D @ ¬C,
then C and D are classically disjoint wrt KB.
4. Removing Gaps and Gluts
A paraconsistent logic typically rejects one or
both of the below traditional laws.
– Law of Noncontradiction (LNC): ¬(P ∧ ¬P)
– Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM): P ∨ ¬P
SROIQ4 rejects both.
Example 28. Consider KB = {>(a)}. In a clas-
sical setting, one could infer that a is a mem-
ber of Person unionsq ¬Person. However, in the 4-
valued setting, this is not the case. E.g., aI /∈
p+((Person unionsq ¬Person)I) in any 4-valued inter-
pretation I in which PersonI = 〈∅,∅〉. Similarly,
in the classical setting, one would be able to in-
fer that a is not a member of Person u ¬Person.
However, (Person u ¬Person)(a) is satisfied in
any 4-valued interpretation I in which PersonI =
〈∆,∆〉.
Nevertheless, inserting additional axioms into a
SROIQ4 knowledge base can selectively enforce
the two laws, effectively making the knowledge
base “more classical.” In particular, if LEM is en-
forced but not LNC, then additional classical con-
sequences can be drawn from the knowledge base
while at the same time maintaining paraconsis-
tency.
Following Arieli [3], we define the sets EM(KB)
(“excluded middle”) and EFQ(KB) (“ex falso
quodlibet”). In any 4-model of KB ∪ EM(KB),
LEM holds for concept assertions: For any indi-
vidual a and atomic concept A, either A(a) or
¬A(a) is satisfied. Similarly, in any 4-model of
KB∪EFQ(KB), LNC holds: At most one of A(a)
or ¬A(a) is satisfied.
Definition 29. Let KB be a SROIQ4 knowledge
base:
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– EM(KB) =def {> @ (A unionsq ¬A) : A =
∃R.Self or A ∈ NC ∪No}.
– EFQ(KB) =def {(A u ¬A) @ ⊥ : A =
∃R.Self or A ∈ NC ∪No}.
Proposition 30. I is a 4-model of EM(KB) iff for
each concept C of KB,
p+(CI) ∪ p−(CI) = ∆I .
Proposition 31. I is a 4-model of EFQ(KB) iff
for each concept C of KB,
p+(CI) ∩ p−(CI) = ∅.
In [3], adding the analog of EM(KB) to Arieli’s
logic yields Kleene’s K3, while adding the analog
of EFQ(KB) yields LP . The maneuver here can
be seen as simulating similar logics in the DL set-
ting. Both of these logics are deductively stronger
than SROIQ4. Since the purpose of SROIQ4
is to reason paraconsistently, adding EM(KB)
to a knowledge base brings SROIQ4 closer to
SROIQ without abandoning that objective.
Adding both EM(KB) and EFQ(KB) allow
one to simulate—to a point—SROIQ reasoning
in SROIQ4. Let I4 be a 4-interpretation of KB.
We define a corresponding 2-interpretation I2 as
shown below. Only the positive extensions are used
in the construction.
– ∆I2 =def ∆I4 .
– For each individual a ∈ NI , aI2 =def aI4 .
– For each role R ∈ NR, RI2 =def p+(RI4).
– For each C ∈ NC ∪No, CI2 =def p+(CI4).
Proposition 32. I4 is a 4-model of EM(KB) ∪
EFQ(KB) iff for each concept C,
CI4 = 〈CI2 ,∆− CI2〉.
Proposition 33. Let I4 be a 4-model of EM(KB)∪
EFQ(KB). If A is a SROIQ4 axiom of KB and
not of the form ¬R(a, b), Irr(R), or Dis(R,S),
then I2 is a 2-model of A iff I4 is a 4-model of A.
Proposition 34. If KB is a SROIQ4 knowledge
base lacking axioms of the form ¬R(a, b), Irr(R),
or Dis(R,S), then
KB ∪ EM(KB) ∪ EFQ(KB)
has a 4-model iff KB has a 2-model.
Example 35. Consider the set KB
{Sedan(c435), V an(c435), Sedan v ¬V an}
of axioms from Example 13, and let I4 be defined
as follows: ∆I4 = {c435}, c435I4 = c435, and
SedanI4 = V anI4 = 〈{c435}, {c435}〉. I4 is a 4-
valued model the axioms. However, it is not a 4-
valued model of (V an u ¬V an) v ⊥, and so it is
not a 4-valued model of EFQ(KB).
The 2-valued counterpart I2 of I4 is: ∆I2 =
{c435}, c435I2 = c435, SedanI2 = V anI2 =
{c435}. This is not a 2-valued model of KB (the
knowledge base has no such models). As implied
by Proposition 34, KB ∪ EFQ(KB) has no 4-
valued models. This can be seen by noting that
c435I ∈ p+(V anI) ∩ p−(V anI) in any 4-valued
model I of KB.
Propositions 33 and 34 do not allow the role as-
sertions above because we cannot add axioms for
roles similar to EM(KB) and EFQ(KB). Such
constructions involving roles are not allowed in
SROIQ or SROIQ4. If roles are taken as biva-
lent, then obviously the ban can be lifted.2
5. Embedding SROIQ4 into SROIQ
To allow the use of classical DL reasoners with
SROIQ4, we provide a translation function pi
(Table 5) from SROIQ4 into SROIQ. Each
atomic concept C in a SROIQ4 knowledge base
is left untouched, but the negated concept ¬C be-
comes the new atomic concept C ′. In this way
the 4-satisfiable concept C u ¬C becomes the 2-
satisfiable CuC ′.3 Below, L is used to refer to the
language of SROIQ4, and L′ will be used to refer
to the language created by adding primed coun-
terparts to all atomic roles and concepts in L. We
also add new atomic concepts CR.Self for each R
in L, and Co for each nominal o ∈ No. These will
be used to stand for the negations of R.Self and
nominals, respectively.
It is clear that if KB is a SROIQ4 knowl-
edge base, then pi(KB) is a SROIQ knowledge
2Alternatively, one could attempt to address this issue
by enhancing the language with further constructs for roles,
as is done in [65]. However, the details of this remain to be
spelled out.
3The basic approach is based on a method of translating
paraconsistent propositional logics into classical logic [7,3].
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base. Furthermore, since the transformation does
not syntactically affect role inclusion axioms, if the
role hierarchy is regular in KB, then it will be
regular in pi(KB). Similarly, the counterpart of a
simple role in KB is itself simple in pi(KB). As
this is so, it is assured that pi does not lead to
undecidability.
As equality between individuals is interpreted
classically in SROIQ4, the most obvious trans-
lation of cardinality restrictions sometimes leads
to unnecessary inconsistencies. Example 36 below
illustrates how pi avoids it. Section 6 shows that
nominals cause a similar difficulty. In that case,
however, the inconsistencies cannot be removed.
Example 36 ([46], Ex. 1). The assertion
((≥ 2R.C) ∧ (≤ 1R.C))(a)
is 4-satisfiable but not 2-satisfiable. If the following
scheme is used to translate cardinality restrictions
pi(≤ nR.C) =≤ nR.pi(C)
pi(¬ ≤ nR.C) =≥ (n+ 1)R.pi(C)
pi(≥ nR.C) =≥ nR.pi(C)
pi(¬ ≥ nR.C) =≤ (n− 1)R.pi(C)
then the assertion remains unchanged and so clas-
sically unsatisfiable. The actual translation pi,
however, yields the 2-satisfiable (≥ 2R.C) ∧ (≤
1R.¬C ′). While concepts ¬C ′ and C intuitively
refer to the same thing, they are formally distinct.
In general, the relationship between K |= P and
the unsatisfiability of K ∪ {¬P} does not hold in
the paraconsistent context, and so entailment can-
not be reduced to satisfiability checking. Never-
theless, there is a strong and useful relationship
between KB and pi(KB) that allows the use of
satisfiability. If KB entails A in SROIQ4, then
pi(KB) entails pi(A) in SROIQ (Proposition 39).
From this, it follows that pi(KB)∪{¬pi(A)} is clas-
sically inconsistent.
Let L be the language of SROIQ4. If I
is a 4-interpretation of L, then define the 2-
interpretation I ′ (the primed counterpart of I)
over L′ as follows:
– ∆I
′
=def ∆
I .
– For each individual a ∈ NI , aI′ =def aI .
– For each role R ∈ NR∪N−R , RI
′
=def p
+(RI)
and R′I
′
=def p
−(RI).
– For each atomic concept C ∈ NC , CI′ =def
p+(CI) and C ′I
′
=def p
−(CI).
– For each nominal o ∈ NO, oI′ =def p+(CI),
and C
I′
o =def p
−(oI).
– For each role R ∈ NR∪N−R , (∃R.Self)I
′
=def
p+((∃R.Self)I), and
– For each role R ∈ NR ∪ N−R , CI
′
R.Self =def
p−((∃R.Self)I).
It is clear that there is a 1–1 correspondence
between the 4-interpretations of L and the 2-
interpretations of L′.
Proposition 37. For any 4-interpretation I with
primed counterpart I ′, and SROIQ4 concept C,
p+(CI) = pi(C)I
′
and p−(CI) = pi(¬C)I′ both
hold.
Proposition 38. For any 4-interpretation I, I is a
4-model of SROIQ4 axiom A iff its primed coun-
terpart I ′ is a 2-model of pi(A).
Proposition 39. For any SROIQ4 knowledge
base KB and axiom A, KB |=SROIQ4 A iff
pi(KB) |=SROIQ pi(A).
It is Proposition 39 that shows that reasoning
with SROIQ4 can be performed using the trans-
lation pi and a classical reasoner.
Example 40. Consider the set {Sedan(c435),
V an(c435), Sedan @ ¬V an, Sedan v V ehicle}.
In any 4-valued model I, it must be the case that
c435I ∈ p+(SedanI) and c435I ∈ p+(V anI),
and also c435I ∈ p+((¬V an)I) and c435I ∈
p+(V ehicleI). As such, c435I
′ ∈ SedanI′ , c435I′
∈ V anI′ , c435I′ ∈ SedanI′ , and c435I′ ∈ V an′I′ ,
where I ′ is the primed-counterpart of I and V an′
is pi(¬V an). Note that pi(Sedan @ ¬V an) =
Sedan v V an′, and so it is clear that I ′ is a 2-
valued model of pi(Sedan @ ¬V an). It is trivial
to determine that I ′ must be a 2-valued model of
pi(KB) (Proposition 38).
In agreement with Proposition 37, p+(V anI) =
V anI
′
= pi(V an)I
′
and p−(V anI) = pi(¬V an)I′ .
Also, V ehicle(c435) is entailed both by the origi-
nal knowledge base under the 4-valued semantics
and by the translated knowledge base under the 2-
valued semantics, in accordance with Proposition
39.
6. Partial Paraconsistency
SROIQ4 is intended to avoid the explosions
caused by inconsistencies. Unfortunately, some
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Table 5
Translation of SROIQ4 into SROIQ.
pi(C) = C, where C ∈ NC pi(¬C) = C′, where C′ new
pi(o) = o, where o ∈ No pi(¬o) = Co, o ∈ No and Co new
pi(¬¬C) = pi(C)
pi(>) = > pi(¬>) = ⊥
pi(⊥) = ⊥ pi(¬⊥) = >
pi(E uD) = pi(E) u pi(D) pi(¬(E uD)) = pi(¬E) unionsq pi(¬D)
pi(E unionsqD) = pi(E) unionsq pi(D) pi(¬(E unionsqD)) = pi(¬E) u pi(¬D)
pi(∀R.C) = ∀R.pi(C) pi(¬(∀R.C)) = ∃R.pi(¬C)
pi(∃R.C) = ∃R.pi(C) pi(¬(∃R.C)) = ∀R.pi(¬C)
pi(∃R.Self) = ∃R.Self pi(¬∃R.Self) = CR.Self
pi(≤ nR.C) =≤ nR.¬pi(¬C) pi(¬≤nR.C)=≥(n+ 1)R.pi(C)
pi(≥ nR.C) =≥ nR.pi(C) pi(¬≥nR.C)=≤(n−1)R.¬pi(¬C)
pi(C(a)) = pi(C)(a) pi(a 6= b) = (a 6= b)
pi(R(a, b)) = R(a, b) pi(¬R(a, b)) = R′(a, b)
pi(Ref(R)) = Ref(R) pi(Irr(R)) = Ref(R′)
pi(Dis(R,S)) = {R v S′, S v R′}
pi(C 7→ D) = ¬pi(¬C) v pi(D) material inclusion
pi(C @ D) = pi(C) v pi(D) internal inclusion
pi(C → D) = {pi(C @ D), pi(¬D @ ¬C)} strong inclusion
pi(w v Rn+1) = w v Rn+1, with w = R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn role inclusion
SROIQ4 knowledge bases—e.g., {(> u ⊥)(a)}—
have no 4-models, and so SROIQ4 is only “par-
tially” paraconsistent. In some cases, inconsistent
knowledge bases can be re-written into a classi-
cally equivalent form that avoids explosion. How-
ever, this is not the case in general.
In [50], it was reported that consistency can
be maintained in SHIQ4 by replacing > and
⊥ with classically equivalent formulas. Specifi-
cally, let SF (KB) be the knowledge base obtained
by replacing each > with A unionsq ¬A and each ⊥
with A u ¬A (where A is a new atomic concept).
SF (KB) is guaranteed to possess a 4-model. How-
ever, nominals can conflict with cardinality restric-
tions, and so the analogous claim does not hold for
SROIQ4. For instance, any assertion of the form
≥ n+1R.{a1, . . . , an}(b) has no 4-valued models.4
More simply, nominals can directly conflict with
inequality assertions.
Example 41. Suppose that the unique name as-
sumption is enforced in a given knowledge base
for days of the week (using axioms monday 6=
4This is so regardless of whether nominals are interpreted
classically or as done here.
tuesday, tuesday 6= wednesday, etc.). Then the
following set of assertions has no 4-valued models.
AvailableDay ⊆ {monday,wednesday},
AvailableDay(tuesday)
In order to maintain satisfiability, either cardi-
nality restrictions (and inequality assertions with
them) or nominals must go.
Proposition 42. If C is a concept description in
which nominals, >, and ⊥ do not appear, then C
is 4-satisfiable.
Proof. Let n be the largest integer used in an ≥
nR.C restriction. Let CI = 〈∆,∆〉 for each C ∈
NC , where |∆| = n+1. For each R ∈ NR, let RI =
〈∆2,∆2〉 and (∃R.Self)I = 〈∆,∆〉. We induct on
a the degree of C. If C ∈ NC , the claim clearly
holds. Examining the SROIQ4 semantics shows
that where C is ¬D, D unionsqE, D uE, ∀R.D, ∃R.D,
≥ nR.D, or ≤ nR.D, CI = 〈∆,∆〉.
Proposition 43. If KB is a SROIQ4 knowledge
base in which inequality assertions and nominals
do not appear, then SF (KB) has a 4-model.
Proof. We use the interpretation I above. For sim-
ple assertions C(a) and R(a, b), the claim obvi-
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ously holds. Since the anti-extension of each role
R is ∆2, ¬R(a, b) also holds (we here reasonably
assume that R 6= U), as do Ref(R), Irr(R), and
Dis(R,S). Since for all concepts C and D, CI =
DI = 〈∆,∆〉, it follows that C @ D and C → D
hold. For C 7→ D, observe that ∆I−p−(CI) = ∅,
and so C 7→ D must be true in I. The cases for
RIAs are similar to C @ D.
Proposition 44. If C is a SROIQ4 concept de-
scription in which ≤, ≥, >, and ⊥ do not appear,
then C is 4-satisfiable.
Proof. Let ∆I = {d}, CI = 〈{d}, {d}〉 for each
C ∈ NC ∪ No, and aI = d for each a ∈ NI . For
each R ∈ NR, let RI = 〈{(d, d)}, {(d, d)}〉 and
(∃R.Self)I = 〈{d}, {d}〉. Inducting on the degree
of C, if C ∈ NC ∪ No or C = ∃R.Self , then the
claim holds. Examining the semantics of the con-
cept description operators shows that the claim
holds for ¬C, C unionsqD, C uD, ∃R.C, and ∀R.C.
Proposition 45. If KB is a SROIQ4 knowledge
base in which inequality assertions, ≤, and ≥, do
not appear, then SF (KB) has a 4-model.
Proof. Using I above, consider each type of axiom.
For C(a) and R(a, b), the claim obviously holds.
Since p−(RI) = {(d, d)}, ¬R(a, b) also holds (we
assume that R 6= U). It is clear that Ref(R),
Irr(R), and Dis(R,S) also hold. Since for all con-
cepts C and D, CI = DI = 〈{d}, {d}〉, C @ D
and C → D hold. For C 7→ D, ∆I − p−(CI) = ∅,
and so I 4-satisfies C 7→ D. The cases for RIAs
proceed similarly.
One obvious solution to the conflict between
cardinality restrictions and inequality assertions,
on the one hand, and nominals on the other is
to use pseudo-nominals in place of real nomi-
nals. E.g., instead of specifying the days of the
week with the nominal {monday, tuesday, . . .}, we
represent the individuals with classes Monday unionsq
Tuesday unionsq . . .. In practice, this is sometimes done.
However, it is well known that the ontology ob-
tained via the substitution is not classically equiv-
alent to the original, and furthermore that the use
of pseudo-nominals leads to intuitively incorrect
results. It’s the same in the 4-valued context. How-
ever, to achieve paraconsistency, something of the
classical logic must be abandoned, and for many
applications, the loss of real nominals might be
acceptable.
7. Tractable DLs
The latest revision of the Web Ontology Lan-
guage (OWL 2) [30] features profiles having poly-
nomial time complexities [57]. Below, we exam-
ine the tractable languages upon which these pro-
files are based. In particular, we examine EL++,
which corresponds to OWL 2 EL; DL-Lite, which
corresponds to OWL 2 QL; and Horn-SHOIQ,
which is an extension of OWL 2 RL. We focus on
whether reasoning with the four-valued semantics
presented earlier can preserve the tractability of
these logics. Specifically, we focus on whether the
reduction to classical logics yields formulas still
within a tractable logic. It turns out that it does,
provided internal inclusion is used. For material
and strong inclusion, however, the reduction pro-
duces formulas outside of the tractable fragment.
7.1. EL++
The syntax of EL++, which restricts that of
SROIQ, is shown in Table 6. RIAs of the form
R v S and R1 ◦R2 ◦ . . . ◦Rn v S,
where Ri, S ∈ NR, are also allowed. Expressions
involving concrete domains are permitted, too, but
we do not consider them here. The semantics of
EL++ is the same as that of SROIQ.
The knowledge base {A v ⊥, A(a)} shows that
EL++ knowledge bases can be inconsistent. Incon-
sistency is caused specifically by the presence of
⊥, and consistency can be restored by replacing
each occurrence of ⊥ with the classically equiva-
lent A⊥ u ¬A⊥ (where A⊥ is a new atomic con-
cept). Doing this is unproblematic: since the nega-
tion appears in front of an atomic concept, it will
be eliminated when processed by pi. In general, ap-
plying pi to an EL++ concept (or a concept con-
taining ¬A) produces an EL++ concept.
Unfortunately, the use of the paraconsistent in-
clusion operators causes problems. Applying pi to
C @ D yields pi(C) v pi(D), where pi(C) and pi(D)
are EL++ concepts. As such, pi(C) v pi(D) is still
an EL++ axiom, and so internal inclusion does
not destroy the tractability of EL++. However, ap-
plying pi to GCIs using → and 7→ yield formulas
not expressible in EL++, and so the guarantee of
tractability is lost.
Example 46.
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Table 6
EL++ and Horn-SHOIQ◦. The Horn-SHOIQ◦ normal form used is due to [43]. A, A1, A2, B are atomic concepts or
nominals. EL++ ontologies may also contain RIAs.
Tractability
Language GCIs Preservation
EL++ C v D, where yes (only for @)
C,D = > | ⊥ | {a} | C1 u C2 | ∃r.C
Horn-SHOIQ◦ > v A, A v ⊥, A1 uA2 v B, yes (only for @)
∃R.A v B, A v ∃R.B, A v ∀S.B,
A v≥ nR.B, A v≤ 1R.B.
pi(A1 uA2 7→ B) = ¬(A′1 unionsqA′2) v B
pi(A1 uA2 → B) = {A1 uA2 v B,
B′ v (A′1 unionsqA′2)}
Given the above discussion, the following theo-
rem holds.
Proposition 47. For any EL++ knowledge base
KB and axiom α, KB |=4 α iff pi(KB) |=2 pi(α).
If all GCIs use @, then pi(KB) is an EL++ knowl-
edge base.
Proof. The first claim holds in virtue of Proposi-
tion 39. Because applying pi to any EL++ concept,
RIA, or GCI C @ D yields an EL++ expression,
the second claim holds.
Furthermore, since there is no negative role con-
structor to cause further inconsistencies in EL++,
roles and RIAs can be interpreted classically (pi
would not alter them, anyway).
7.2. Horn-DLs
We focus on Horn-SHOIQ◦ [43]. The conclu-
sions obtained for it hold for other Horn-DLs as
well, including Horn-SHOIQ [56]. It’s assumed
that Horn-SHOIQ◦ ontologies are in the normal
form [43] shown in Table 6.
All of the Horn-SHOIQ◦ concept constructors
result in Horn-SHOIQ◦ expressions under pi ex-
cept ≤ 1R.B, because pi(≤ 1R.B) =≤ 1R.¬B′.
However, we can remain within Horn-SHOIQ◦ by
post-processing the result of pi as shown below.
– piHorn(C) = C, if C is
>|⊥|A|A1 uA2|∃R.A|∀S.B| ≥ nR.B;
– piHorn(≤1R.B) = ≤1R.B= (where B= is a
new concept), with B= uB′ v ⊥ asserted;
– piHorn(¬(≤1R.B)) = ≥2R.B.
The last item is needed for processing inclusion
axioms involving ≤1R.B:
– piHorn(A 7→ ≤1R.B) =
{¬A′ v ≤1R.B=, B= uB′ v ⊥}
– piHorn(A @ ≤1R.B) =
{A v ≤1R.B=, B= uB′ v ⊥}
– piHorn(A→ ≤1R.B) =
{A v ≤1R.B=, B= uB′ v ⊥,≥ 2R.B v A′}
Given the above way of transforming axioms,
piHorn(A @ ≤1R.B) is permissible, but the trans-
formations for material and strong inclusion ax-
ioms are not. The example used for EL++ also
works as a counterexample for the use of 7→ and→
in Horn-SHOIQ◦. Since A1 u A2 v B is allowed
in other Horn-DLs, the same conclusion holds for
them. And so, if we wish to preserve the structure
of tractable Horn-DLs, we must use only internal
inclusion.
Proposition 48. If KB is a Horn-SHOIQ◦ knowl-
edge base using only @-axioms, then it follows
that piHorn(pi(KB)) is a Horn-SHOIQ◦ knowl-
edge base.
Given the revised pi function, the conclusion ob-
viously holds. The revised function also works for
DLP [28], which corresponds to OWL 2 RL.
Observe that the additional transformations are
sound, in the following sense.
Proposition 49. Let KB ∪ {A} be a set of Horn-
SHOIQ◦ assertions, with all GCIs being @-
axioms. If piHorn(pi(KB)) |=2 piHorn(pi(A)), then
pi(KB) |=2 pi(A).
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7.3. DL-Lite
The logics of the DL-Lite family are the maxi-
mal DLs supporting efficient query answering over
large numbers of instances. The usual DL rea-
soning tasks performed in the DL-Lite family are
known to be polynomial in the size of the KB (and
LOGSPACE in the size of the ABox), and query an-
swering is LOGSPACE in the size of the ABox [12].
Moreover, the DL-Lite family allows for separation
between TBox and ABox reasoning during query
evaluation. In particular, ABox reasoning can be
carried out by an SQL engine [12].
We focus on two members of the DL-Lite family:
DL-Litecore, which forms the kernel of the family;
and DL-LiteR, which corresponds to OWL 2 QL.
Concepts and roles of the DL-Lite family are
formed using the grammar [12]
B ::= A | ∃R R ::= P | P−
C ::= B | ¬B E ::= R | ¬R
where A ∈ NC , P ∈ NR, and P− ∈ N−R . Table 7
shows the syntax definitions of GCIs and RIAs.
A paraconsistent semantics similar to that de-
scribed for SROIQ can be provided for DL-
Litecore and DL-LiteR. Roles are 4-valued (Table
8), but ∃R and ¬∃R are treated differently than
in SROIQ4. Intuitively, p+((∃R)I) is set of indi-
viduals x positively related to some y via R, while
p−((∃R)I) is the set of individuals x negatively
related to all y via R.
The knowledge base {B v ¬A,B(a), A(a)}
is classically unsatisfiable in DL-Litecore. {P1 v
P2, P1 v ¬P2, P1(a, b)} is classically unsatisfiable
in DL-LiteR. In the 4-valued context, however, ev-
ery knowledge base is satisfiable.
Proposition 50. Every DL-Litecore and DL-LiteR
knowledge base is 4-satisfiable.
The DL-Lite pi-transformations are given below.
It is clear that the transformation of internal in-
clusion axioms stays within DL-Lite.
Definition 51. Where R and E are roles, the DL-
Lite pi transformations are defined inductively.
– piLite(R v E) = piLite(R) v piLite(E);
– piLite(¬R) = R′, where R′ is a new role name;
– piLite(∃R) = ∃R;
– piLite(¬∃R) = ¬∃R=, where R= is a new role
name and R= v ¬R′;
For material inclusion and strong inclusion, be-
cause negated concepts are not allowed to occur
on the left of a GCI, they do not preserve the DL-
Lite structure. In contrast, the transformation of
internal inclusion remains within DL-Lite. How-
ever, observe that the transformation
piLite(A @ ¬∃R) = {A v ¬∃R=, R= v ¬R′}
introduces a role inclusion axiom. In general, a DL-
Litecore knowledge base might be transformed into
a DL-LiteR knowledge base. Regardless of this, the
transformation preserves consequences.
Proposition 52. If KB is a DL-Lite knowledge
base and A an axiom (in which neither 7→ nor →
are used),
KB |=4 A iff piLite(KB) |=DL-LiteR piLite(A).
8. ELP
ELP [44] is a tractable rule language combin-
ing features of EL++ with Horn-like rules. Syntac-
tically, ELP resembles Datalog or logic program-
ming, in the sense that well-formed formulas are
rules of the form B 7→H, where B and H are both
conjunctions. In ELP, however, each conjunct is
either a concept atom C(t) or a role atom R(t1, t2),
where C is an EL++ concept description, R is an
EL++ role, and each t is a term (an individual
from NI or else a variable from a set V of vari-
ables). Each rule is implicitly universally quanti-
fied (there are no free variables). To ensure de-
cidability, it is assumed that there is a fixed set
Vs ⊆ V of safe variables; these range only over
named elements of the domain of discourse.
Below, we present a paraconsistent semantics for
ELP, defining what we call ELP4. The semantics
is similar to one provided for a first-order logic
defined by Lang [45], the primary differences be-
ing that we make use of internal implication ⊃
where Lang uses his own implication operator, and
we include safe variables (these could be omitted,
however, yielding an undecidable logic). The rules
described below confine themselves to what are
essentially unary and binary predicates, but it is
clear that the semantics can be easily modified to
apply to rules using predicates of arbitrary arity.
Furthermore, in order to ensure tractability, ELP
rules conform to certain syntactic restrictions. We
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Table 7
DL-Lite Family
Language GCIs Role Inclusions Tractability preservation
DL-Litecore B v C ∅ yes (only for @)
DL-LiteR B v C R v E yes (only for @)
Table 8
Four-valued semantics for expressions in DL-Lite
Syntax Semantics
∃R 〈{x | ∃y, (x, y) ∈ p+(RI )}, {x | ∀y, (x, y) ∈ p−(RI )}〉
¬∃R 〈{x | ∀y, (x, y) ∈ p−(RI )}, {x | ∃y, (x, y) ∈ p+(RI )}〉
do not discuss the restrictions below. However, the
embedding into classical ELP maintains the syn-
tactic structure of the rules, and so tractability is
preserved. Also, since the restrictions are not part
of the discussion, it is clear that most of the def-
initions and results below apply equally well to
rule-bases that do not satisfy them.
As originally defined, a rule base for ELP con-
sists of rules of the form B 7→H, where 7→ is just
material implication. In moving to the 4-valued
context, we also allow rules using internal (⊃) and
strong (→) implication. 4-valued interpretations
for ELP rule bases are defined essentially as they
were earlier. However, semantics for rules must be
given. This is done by defining two forms of satis-
faction: t-satisfaction (|=t) and f-satisfaction (|=f ).
The notation |=t and |=f is adopted from Lang
[45].
Definition 53. An element d ∈ ∆I is named in
interpretation I iff there is an a ∈ NI such that
aI = d. Otherwise, d is unnamed in I. A variable
assignment σI for I is a function from V ∪NI to
∆I such that
1. if t ∈ NI , then σI(t) = tI ;
2. if t ∈ VS, then σI(t) is named in I.
If I is an interpretation and σI an assignment for
I, then σI [x/d] is a function from V ∪NI to ∆I
such that for all t ∈ NI ∪ V ,
1. if t 6= x, then σI [x/d](t) = σI(t);
2. otherwise, σI [x/d](t) = d.
Observe that if x ∈ Vs but d is not named in I,
σI [x/d] is not a valid assignment.
Definition 54. Let I be an interpretation and σI a
variable assignment for I.
1. If C is a concept description and t a term,
– I, σI |=t C(t) iff σI(t) ∈ p+(CI).
– I, σI |=f C(t) iff σI(t) ∈ p−(CI).
2. If R is a role and t1 and t2 terms,
– I, σI |=t R(t1, t2) iff (σI(t1), σI(t2)) ∈
p+(RI).
– I, σI |=f R(t1, t2) iff (σI(t1), σI(t2)) ∈
p−(RI).
3. For conjunction (P ∧Q),
– I, σI |=t (P ∧ Q) iff I, σI |=t P and
I, σ |=t Q,
– I, σI |=f (P ∧ Q) iff I, σI |=f P or
I, σ |=f Q,
4. For material implication (P7→Q),
– I, σI |=t (P7→Q) iff I, σI |=f P or
I, σI |=t Q,
– I, σI |=f (P7→Q) iff I, σI |=t P and
I, σI |=f Q,
5. For internal implication (P ⊃ Q),
– I, σI |=t (P ⊃ Q) iff I, σI 6|=t P or
I, σI |=t Q,
– I, σI |=f (P ⊃ Q) iff I, σI |=t P and
I, σI |=f Q,
6. For strong implication (P → Q),
– I, σI |=t (P → Q) iff (I, σI 6|=t P
or I, σI |=t Q) and (I, σI |=f P or
I, σI 6|=f Q).
– I, σI |=f (P → Q) iff I, σI |=t P and
I, σI |=f Q.
7. For (∀x)P,
(a) if x ∈ Vs,
– I, σI |=t (∀x)P iff I, σI [x/d] |=t P
for all named d ∈ ∆I ,
– I, σI |=f (∀x)P iff I, σI [x/d] |=f P
for some named d ∈ ∆I .
(b) if x /∈ Vs,
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– I, σI |=t (∀x)P iff I, σI [x/d] |=t P
for all d ∈ ∆I ,
– I, σI |=f (∀x)P iff I, σI [x/d] |=f P
for some d ∈ ∆I .
Definition 55. Let I be an interpretation, P a well-
formed formula of ELP , and K a set of such for-
mulas.
1. I 4-satisfies P (I is a 4-model of P) iff
I, σI |=t P for each assignment σI .
2. K entails P (K |=ELP4 P) iff every 4-model
of K is a 4-model of P.
According to [44], every classical ELP rule base
can be converted into an equisatisfiable one via
the transformation rules shown in Table 9. Since
there are three different types of rules, the analo-
gous claim is problematic in the 4-valued context.
Nevertheless, if rules are interpreted using ⊃, con-
version to normal form preserves 4-satsifiability.
Definition 56. Let RB be an ELP rule base uti-
lizing only ⊃-rules. RB is in normal form iff for
each rule B ⊃ H,
1. Each concept atom in B is of the form C(t),
where C ∈ NC ∪No ∪ {>},
2. Each atom in H is of the form A(t), ∃R.B(t),
or R(t, u), where
(a) A ∈ NC ∪No ∪ {⊥},
(b) B ∈ NC ,
(c) R ∈ NR, and
(d) t, u ∈ V ∪NI .
3. Every variable in H appears in B.
Proposition 57. Let KB be a ⊃-rule base and KB′
the result of applying one of H1,. . .,H4, B1,. . .,B3
from Table 9 to KB. KB is 4-satisfiable iff KB′
is.
We define the sequence KB0, KB1, . . ., where
KB0 = KB and KBn+1 is the result of applying
one transformation rule to KBn. Let KBN be the
first n such that KBn = KBn+1. KBN is in nor-
mal form [44]. Given the above proposition, it is
clear that KBN is satisfiable if and only if KB is.
The transformation pi can be extended in a
rather simple fashion to embed ELP4 into classical
ELP, provided ⊃ is used. As with the tractable de-
scription logics, the other inclusion operators yield
structures outside of the language (one could nev-
ertheless use → and 7→ as well, translating them
as indicated in Table 5. Doing so would not yield
meaningless expressions, but the results would not
constitute expressions of ELP). Since the struc-
ture of the rule base is left intact by the transfor-
mation, the syntactic constraints on ELP rules are
met.
pi(C(t)) = pi(C)(t)
pi(R(t1, t2)) = pi(R)(t1, t2)
pi(Q∧R) = pi(Q) ∧ pi(R)
pi(Q∨R) = pi(Q) ∨ pi(R)
pi(Q ⊃ R) = pi(Q)7→pi(R)
pi((∀x)Q) = (∀x)pi(Q)
Define pi(KB) as {pi(R)|R ∈ KB}. Earlier,
we defined the primed counterpart I ′ for each
4-interpretation I, and we showed that for any
SROIQ concept C, p+(CI) = pi(C)I′ and
p−(CI) = pi(¬C)I′ . We show here that for any
rule r : B ⊃ H, I 4-satisfies r iff I ′ 2-satisfies
pi(r).5
Proposition 58. If P is a well-formed formula of
ELP, I is a 4-interpretation of P, and I ′ is the
primed counterpart of I, then for any assignment
σI , I, σI |=t P iff I ′, σI′ |= pi(P).
From this, the preservation of consequences read-
ily follows.
Proposition 59. Let KB be an ELP rule base and
P a well-formed formula of ELP. KB |=ELP4 P
iff pi(KB) |=ELP pi(P).
Example 60. The following set RB of (normal
form) ELP rules is classically inconsistent.
1. motherOf(mary eve)
2. fatherOf(tom eve)
3. divorced(tom)
4. loves(x y) ⊃ happy(x)
5. motherOf(x y) ∧ fatherOf(z y) ⊃ loves(x z)
6. motherOf(x y) ∧ fatherOf(z y) ⊃ loves(z x)
7. divorced(x) ⊃ unhappy(x)
8. happy(x) ∧ unhappy(x) ⊃ ⊥(x)
Because of the occurrence of ⊥, it is also incon-
sistent under the 4-valued semantics. This can be
remedied by replacing rule 8 with 8′ (to form RB′).
8.′ happy(x) ∧ unhappy(x) ⊃ A⊥(x) ∧ ¬A⊥(x).
Though the negation is not technically allowed in
EL++, Upon transformation by pi, A⊥(x)∧¬A⊥(x)
becomes A⊥(x) ∧ A′⊥(x), which is allowed. Apart
5Observe that the set of variables is fixed, regardless of
whether one is talking about I or I′; furthermore, the in-
terpretation of individuals and variables is the same in both
interpretations. And so “safety” is not affected.
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Table 9
Converting a classical ELP rule B 7→H to normal form (taken from [44]).
H1 If (C uD)(t) ∈ H, then replace it with C(t) ∧D(t).
H2 If >(x) ∈ H, then delete it. If H would then be empty, delete r from KB.
H3 If H contains a variable x not occurring in B, add >(x) to B.
H4
If ∃R.C(t) ∈ H with C /∈ NC , replace it in r with ∃R.A(t) where A is new to KB, and add
the rule A(x)7→C(x).
B1 If (C uD)(t) ∈ B, then replace it with C(t) ∧D(t).
B2 If ⊥(x) ∈ B, delete r from KB.
B3 If ∃R.C(t) ∈ B, replace it with R(t, x), C(x), where x is new.
from this and the replacement of ⊃ with 7→, the
rule base is otherwise unaltered.6
We note that RB′ is 4-satisfiable. Furthermore,
pi(RB′) is 2-satisfiable. In both, one may infer
happy(tom) and unhappy(tom) (under the ap-
propriate semantics). However, in neither case
can one infer an arbitrary expression such as
unhappy(mary).
If one were to attempt to transform the rule base
using strong implication (according to Table 5),
then rules 5, 6, and 8 would introduce disjunctions.
For instance,
5′1 motherOf(x y) ∧ fatherOf(z y) 7→loves(x z)
5′2 loves
′(x z)7→motherOf ′(x y) ∨ fatherOf ′(z y).
This is outside of the rule language.
9. Empirical Evaluations
The last two sections indicate that, for some
description logics and their rule-based extensions,
internal inclusion must be used in order to guar-
antee tractability. However, even in cases where
the translation does not lead to expressions of a
strictly more expressive language—e.g., as in the
case of SROIQ—the choice of operator can have
a significant effect on performance. While embed-
ding internal inclusion axioms into a classical DL
potentially leads to the creation of new concept
names, it typically does not increase the number
of inclusion axioms,7 and the translation elimi-
6Though not explicitly stated in [44], A rule of the form
B 7→C(t)∧D(t)∧ ... can be split into two rules, B 7→C(t)∧ ...
and B 7→D(t)∧.... We will assume that such transformations
are also performed when converting to normal form.
7This is not true for the paraconsistent versions of Horn
DLs and DL-Lite, as discussed earlier; for those logics, new
axioms are added.
nates all occurrences of negation. In contrast, em-
bedding strong inclusion axioms essentially dou-
bles both the number of concept names and the
number of inclusion axioms. Embedding material
inclusion introduces negation into the left-hand-
sides of axioms, and it potentially leads to the in-
troduction of a greater number of new concepts
than does internal inclusion. Though the size of
the translation is linear with regard to the size
of the original regardless of the inclusion opera-
tor used, these differences can have a significant
impact and make reasoning with strong and ma-
terial inclusion more difficult than reasoning with
internal inclusion alone.
We have performed a set of empirical tests
which, though tentative and limited in nature, do
appear to support this claim. Several knowledge
bases (either downloaded or else programmatically
created) were translated according to the pi func-
tion described in Section 5, and a DL reasoner
(Pellet [67]) was used to process both the origi-
nal knowledge bases and their translations. Specif-
ically, the reasoner computed class and property
hierarchies, determined class membership for in-
dividuals, and checked for consistency. Some but
not all of the original ontologies were satisfiable.8
The translations were performed using a cus-
tom Java library implementing the pi function and
based on methods provided by the OWL API [33].
Three distinct translations of each knowledge base
were created, each interpreting the inclusion ax-
ioms of the original according to one of the three
new operators.
Two knowledge bases were created specifically
for the tests using the Lehigh Benchmark (LUBM)
8The number of unsatisfiable concepts in each ontology
is: amino-acid (0), pizza (2), proton (15), tambis-patched
(144), university-1 (0), university-2 (0), wine (0).
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suite [27]. The suite provides a tool for generat-
ing ontologies populated with a variable number
of universities, departments, professors, students,
etc. For the evaluations, the default settings of
the tool were used, but the resulting knowledge
bases were manually edited.9 Disjoint class axioms
were also manually added (asserting, e.g., that as-
sistant, associate, and full professors are disjoint
classes). Inconsistent versions of the knowledge
bases were also created by inserting same-as asser-
tions (stating, for instance, that a particular stu-
dent was identical to a publication).
For the experiments, each ontology was pro-
cessed 21 times (without restarting between runs),
and the time required to complete all computa-
tions was recorded. The first run—which involved
memory allocation not occurring in subsequent
runs—was ignored in each case. A 15 minute time-
limit was used; runs requiring more time than that
were terminated. All experiments were performed
on a consumer desktop computer.
Tables 10 and 11 describe the knowledge bases
evaluated. The relative sizes of the translations are
given in Table 12. As shown there, translating ac-
cording to strong inclusion typically increases the
number of concept names by a factor of 2. The
number of inclusion axioms is not doubled—it is
assumed that this is due to the presence of du-
plicate axioms that are eliminated by the OWL
API. As far as the concepts are concerned, factors
greater than 2 can be attributed to the presence of
nominals in the input. Factors less than 2 are also
possible, as when concepts only appear in positive
concept assertions. Using material inclusion or in-
ternal inclusion also increases the number of con-
cepts. However, this number is smaller than when
strong inclusion is used.
Table 13 displays the average time required to
process the knowledge bases and their transla-
tions. When internal inclusion was used, the test
system was in each case able to process the trans-
lation (the time required was significantly greater
than that needed for the original, however). In
9The smaller knowledge base consisted of 5 departments,
25 research groups, 1000 (graduate and teaching) courses,
100 professors (lecturer, assistant, associate, full), 1000 stu-
dents (graduate and undergraduate), 500 publications, and
200 teaching and research assistants. The larger instance
contained roughly 2-8 times these numbers. In both cases,
10 universities were used.
contrast, if either strong or material inclusion was
used, processing the translation was typically not
possible. The reasoner either ran out of memory,
or else execution was manually terminated due to
the time-limit. The inability to process knowledge
bases based on material inclusion can be explained
by the introduction of negation into axioms. This
does not occur when internal inclusion is used.
10. Conclusions and Related Work
In this paper, we have described several para-
consistent description logics, including SROIQ4,
and we have shown that they are classically sound
and that their embeddings into classical logics are
consequence preserving. It should be pointed out
that since the most recent version of OWL [30] is
based in large part on SROIQ, it is not unrea-
sonable to suppose that SROIQ4 has real practi-
cal value. Inconsistencies often arise in real world
situations, and the theory surrounding SROIQ4
allows the use of existing classical OWL inference
engines to reason correctly even over inconsistent
OWL knowledge bases.
The issue of handling inconsistency is a common
one in the field of knowledge representation and
reasoning, and also more generally in the context
of data management. Beyond multivalued para-
consistent logics, several other approaches have
been studied. For instance, regardless of whether
they are paraconsistent or not, the various non-
monotonic logics that have been developed over
the years (e.g., Reiter’s default logic [63], logic
programming under the answer-set [25] or well-
founded [26] semantics, defeasible logic [58]) can
be viewed at least in part as attempts to resolve
conflicts between assertions. E.g., the extended
logic program
p :− ∼ ¬p
¬p :− ∼ p
q :− p
q :− ¬p
possesses two answer sets ({p, q}, and {¬p, q}),
and q is considered a consequence of the program.
The first two rules can be seen as asserting pre-
sumptive (and conflicting) evidence for both p and
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Table 10
Test knowledge bases
Name Description
Amino Acid An ALCF(D) ontology pertaining to amino-acids. http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/
amino-acid/2006/05/18/amino-acid.owl
Pizza A SHOIN ontology making frequent use of ∃- and ∀-restrictions, and infrequent use of
nominals. http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/pizza/2007/02/12/
Proton A SHI(D) ontology using concepts from the PROTON ontologies, with disjointness axioms
added. http://proton.semanticweb.org/
TAMBIS A SHIN ontology for the molecular biology domain. http://owl.cs.manchester.ac.uk/
repository/ (tambis-patched.owl)
Wine A SHOIN (D) ontology making heavy use of nominals. http://www.w3.org/TR/
owl-guide/wine.rdf
University 1 A ALEHI+(D) ontology made using the Lehigh Ontology Benchmark Suite [27]. Dis-
jointClasses axioms were manually added. A separate inconsistent version was created by
adding SameAs assertions for individuals in disjoint classes. http://swat.cse.lehigh.edu/
projects/lubm/
University 2 A larger version of University 1. An inconsistent version of the ontology was also generated.
Table 11
Knowledge base sizes
KB Concepts Ind. GCIs Concept Assert. (Obj) Role Assert. Disjoint Concepts Equiv Concepts
Amino Acid 46 0 238 0 0 199 12
Pizza 100 5 259 10 0 398 15
Proton 266 0 278 0 0 1297 0
TAMBIS 395 0 343 0 0 21 150
Wine 77 161 126 182 246 1 61
University 1 43 2640 36 2840 11233 6 6
University 2 43 13865 36 14665 41095 6 6
Table 12
Size increase (relative to original)
Concept GCIs
Ontology Internal Strong Material Internal Strong Material
Amino Acid 1.7 2 1.98 1 1.84 1
Pizza 1.77 2.03 1.75 1 1.27 1
Proton 1.99 2 1.39 1 1.1 1
TAMBIS 1.07 2 1.72 1 1.94 1
Wine 1.03 2.82 2.53 1 1.99 1
University 1 1.51 2 1.72 1 1.43 1
University 2 1.51 2 1.72 1 1.43 1
Disjoint class axioms and equivalent class axioms
were interpreted as sets of inclusion axioms.
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Table 13
Average classification times, in milliseconds.
Knowledge Base Original Internal Strong Material
Amino Acid 102 236 time-limit 18800
Pizza 344 364 time-limit mem-limit
Proton 121 592 739 302850
TAMBIS 337 1098 mem-limit mem-limit
Wine 23105 84201 time-limit time-limit
University 1 251 4415 time-limit mem-limit
University 1 (Inconsistent) N/A 4838 time-limit mem-limit
University 2 1066 58542 time-limit mem-limit
University 2 (Inconsistent) N/A 58805 time-limit mem-limit
Computer: AMD Athlon II X2, 6GB DDR2 RAM, Java SE 6 (64-bit, 4GB RAM).
time-limit: program was manually terminated after 15 minutes.
mem-limit: program exceeded available memory (and automatically terminated).
¬p, and the conflict is resolved by disallowing both
p and ¬p from appearing in a common answer
set. The answer-set semantics, like Reiter’s default
logic and the other common semantics for logic
programs, espouses the principle of explosion. The
mechanism by which conflict is handled is default
negation, and there are programs that are inher-
ently inconsistent (regardless of whether default
negation appears); drawing reasonable conclusions
from such programs is impossible under the most
common semantics for them. Nevertheless, alter-
native paraconsistent semantics for logic programs
[19,20,71,72], and for default logic [29,73,74], have
been proposed.
The most obvious distinction between such for-
malisms and the paraconsistent logics presented
here is that the former are nonmonotonic whereas
the latter (like the underlying description logics
upon which they are based) are monotonic. While
nonmonotonicity is justifiable in many cases (ar-
guably, it is required if one is to model certain
forms of reasoning), it typically comes with a com-
putational penalty. Unrestricted default logic is
not recursively enumerable, for instance. Further-
more, it would be difficult to embed an inherently
nonmonotonic logic into a monotonic one, which
is what we have done here with the paraconsistent
description logics.
Even within the paraconsistent reasoning com-
munity, there are approaches for achieving para-
consistency that differ from the multivalued ap-
proach we have described here. Jas´kowski’s [23,38]
discussive or discursive logics (or “logics of dis-
cussion”) are considered to the first paraconsistent
logic in modern times. In such logics, a proposi-
tion may be viewed as true whenever it has been
proposed by a participant in a discussion. Since it
is possible for participants to disagree, statements
can be both true and false. The semantics for dis-
cussive logics are typically specified indirectly by
a modal logic (e.g., S5). A sentence P of the the-
ory, called a discussive assertion, would be treated
as ♦P (“possibly P”) and interpreted according
to the modal logic. As in the multivalued logics
presented here, many common rules of inference
do not naturally hold under this interpretation. In
particular, Modus Ponens fails, as does the Rule
of Adjunction ({P,Q}/ ∴ P ∧Q). Jas´kowski thus
developed both a “discussive implication” and a
“discussive conjunction”.
Newton da Costa was the first to develop and
publish first-order paraconsistent logics in the
1950s and 1960s, and for that reason he is often
considered the father of paraconsistency [16,18].
Jas´kowski’s work was confined to the proposi-
tional level and was not widely known at the time
[17]. Da Costa is best known for his C-systems,
which constitute an infinite hierarchy of paracon-
sistent logics. Their defining characteristic is that
consistency is explicitly represented in the object
language itself. I.e., a new unary operator ◦ is
added, with ◦P stating that P is consistent. The
logics are typically defined axiomatically, avoid-
ing explosion by replacing certain classical ax-
ioms with weakened counterparts. Semantically,
the logics break the truth-functional connection
between a sentence and its negation. Much later,
Carnielli, Coniglio, and Marcos would generalize
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the C-systems, defining the logics of formal incon-
sistency [14,15].
Neither discussive logic nor the logics based on
da Costa’s have in our opinion received much cov-
erage in fields related to computer science. Within
the philosophical and mathematical communities,
discussive logic has received quite a bit of crit-
icism, particularly for the failure of Adjunction.
In our view, however, many critics appear sim-
ply to be unaware of Jas´kowski’s work on dis-
cussive conjunction. Both sorts of logic have re-
ceived criticism for breaking the usual behavior of
negation, conjunction, and disjunction (e.g., in at
least some of C-systems, De Morgan’s laws do not
hold). One of the few frameworks utilizing a logic
of formal inconsistency in an information system
is described in [21]. There, ideas from the stable
model and well-founded semantics for logic pro-
grams are combined to create a paraconsistent ver-
sion of Datalog.
The formalisms we have noted above allow an
assertion and its negation to be simultaneously
true (in some sense), and the formalisms permit
reasoning under these conditions. In a way, such
systems can be viewed as tolerating inconsistency.
There are indeed a great many other approaches to
handling inconsistency (see, e.g., the papers found
in [11]). In one common view, inconsistencies in a
knowledge base are taken as errors, and algorithms
are developed to identify the errors and repair the
knowledge base. Classic examples of this would be
Reiter’s work [64] on fault diagnosis and the wide
body of literature devoted to belief revision and
truth maintenance systems [1,22,24]. Other work
focuses on the identification of answers to queries
that are consistent with repaired versions of in-
consistent knowledge bases (regardless of whether
or not the knowledge base actually has been re-
paired) [2,13]. We note that the view underlying
such work—i.e., that inconsistencies are faults or
errors in the system—is often correct, and in such
cases it is important to identify the sources of the
error. This is something that the multivalued ap-
proach described here does not do. In the semantic
web context, work on ontology debugging and de-
termining justifications in ontologies (e.g., [40,75])
may also be considered relevant.
Returning to multivalued logics, the logics pre-
sented in this paper are related to earlier 4-valued
description logics developed by Patel-Schneider
[59,60] and also Straccia, Sebastiani, and Meghini
[54,55,68,69]. SROIQ4 is similar to these in the
sense that all are 4-valued and essentially based
on the logics of Belnap, but the earlier logics cor-
respond neither syntactically nor semantically to
SROIQ4. The earlier logics are in fact syntac-
tically closer to ALC and SHIQ, but there are
differences even when restricted to these. Patel-
Schneider’s logic does not allow concept union
or existential role restrictions, and cardinality re-
strictions are unqualified. Equality in the logic is
nonclassical—specifically, it is 4-valued, reflexive,
and symmetric, but it is not necessarily transitive.
Among other things, this affects the definition of
cardinality restrictions—concepts no longer have
a single cardinality in the logic.
Straccia et al. [54,55,68,69] provide 4-valued se-
mantics for ALC-like languages similar to but dis-
tinct from Patel-Schneider’s, and in some cases
sound and complete sequent calculi are provided
[55,69]. The interpretations for existential and uni-
versal role restrictions are the same as those used
in SROIQ4 (from a syntactic and semantic stand-
point, the ALC fragment of SROIQ4 appears to
identical to the logic described in [68]), which is
distinct from those of Patel-Schneider. Subsump-
tion in the logics is what we have called weak
subsumption: C is subsumed by D iff p+(CI) ⊆
p+(DI) in every 4-interpretation. Similarly, equiv-
alence is the weak equivalence defined earlier.
Since cardinality restrictions are not used in the
logics, equality is not addressed.
The work here on SROIQ4 and related logics
constitutes an extended version of materials ap-
pearing in both [46] and [53] (neither ELP nor
the empirical tests are discussed in those works,
however), which are in turn based on earlier work
[47,48,49,50,51]. Regarding this earlier work, the
logic ALC4 is discussed in [47,48,49]. Embedding
ALC4 into classical ALC is discussed in [47] and
[48], while resolution-based reasoning algorithms
are presented in [48] and [49]. SHOIN4 and its
embedding into classical SHOIN [35] are pre-
sented in [51]. In SHOIN4, unqualified cardinal-
ity restrictions are allowed, as are nominals (which
are treated classically). SHIQ4 is presented in
[50], as are paraconsistent versions of EL++, Horn-
DLs, and DL-Lite logics. The latter logics are ana-
lyzed more fully here and in [46]. With one excep-
tion [49], each of these papers describes embedding
a paraconsistent logic into a classical counterpart.
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We are unaware of anything similar to this in the
work by Patel-Schneider and Straccia et al.
Lang [45] has defined paraconsistent semantics
for ALC and SHIQ (which, incidentally, he also
calls ALC4 and SHIQ4) by translating them into
a paraconsistent first-order logic based on Arieli
and Avron’s propositional logic. As noted before,
the 4-valued ELP semantics presented here is sim-
ilar to his first-order logic semantics. Lang also
provides separate schemes for translating his logic
into FOL and for translating paraconsistent ALC4
and SHIQ4 directly into their classical counter-
parts. Paraconsistent equality and inequality are
introduced as special binary relations, together
with suitable axioms. An implication operator,
which we refer to using →L, is also defined.
→L n 0 1 b
n 1 1 1 1
0 1 b 1 b
1 n n 1 1
b n 0 1 b
Since {¬(P →L Q)} |=4 (¬P∧¬Q), the connective
is classically unsound.
More recently, Kamide [41] describes a 4-valued
paraconsistent variant of ALC making use of both
classical and paraconsistent negation. An embed-
ding theorem similar to the ones described here is
also given, as is a sound and complete tableau algo-
rithm. Without the additional negation, the logic
appears to be the same as ALC4 (though there
are certain notational differences). The use of the
additional negation strengthens the logic consider-
ably, however. Indeed, it appears that all classical
ALC consequences are regained.
Zhang et al. [70] present a paraconsistent vari-
ation of SHIQ based on Besnard and Hunter’s
quasi-classical logic [37]. It is claimed that the
logic (QC-SHIQ) remedies problems inherent to
the 4-valued approach described here. Specifically,
a weak semantics (virtually identical to SHIQ4)
is defined in which inclusion is based on internal
inclusion. For the weak semantics, Modus Ponens,
Modus Tollens, and Disjunctive Syllogism all fail.
A strong semantics, building upon the weak, is
provided which does not suffer from this problem
(all three hold).
While it is certainly true that Disjunctive Syllo-
gism fails for SROIQ4 regardless of the inclusion
operator used, Modus Ponens is satisfied by both
internal and strong inclusion, and Modus Tollens
is satisfied by strong inclusion. This is the primary
point of introducing the operators in the para-
consistent logics described here (and, we imagine,
in the propositional logics upon which they are
based).
The failure of Disjunctive Syllogism is indeed
a substantial drawback. The paraconsistent log-
ics described here simply do not permit it un-
der any circumstances. Arieli has recently noted
[4] that Belnap’s 4-valued logic is strictly weaker
than quasi-classical logic.10 Nevertheless, the main
virtue of the paraconsistent DL framework pre-
sented here is that the logics can be embedded
into classical formalisms. This in turn allows clas-
sical tools to be used to reason over even inconsis-
tent knowledge bases. To our knowledge, no sim-
ilar translation scheme has been created for QC-
SHIQ.
Appendix
A. Proofs
A.1. Properties of Implication Operators
Proof of Proposition 2. If  satisfies Modus Po-
nens and the Deduction Theorem, then  satis-
fies none of Modus Tollens, Strong Equivalence, or
Transposition.
Proof. Suppose satisfies Modus Ponens and the
Deduction Theorem. Let A and B be atomic, P =
(A ∨ B), Q = (A ∧ ¬A), and K = {Q}. Let v be
a truth-value assignment such that v(A) = b and
v(B) = 1. Observe that v(P) = 1 and v(Q) = b,
and so every element of K is designated on v. We
consider Modus Tollens, Strong Equivalence and
Transposition separately.
1. Given the definitions of Q and K above, K ∪
{P} |=4 Q and K |=4 ¬Q. Since  satisfies
the Deduction Theorem, K |=4 P  Q. K is
designated on v and yet v(¬P) = 0, and so
K 6|=4 ¬P. As such, does not satisfy Modus
Tollens.
10The comparison was made using the simple proposi-
tional language defined over ¬, ∧, and ∨. Arieli also points
out that quasi-classical logic is in some cases too strong, in
that Disjunctive Syllogism is permitted in too many cases.
E.g., {A,¬A,A ∨ B} `QC B, which will strike many as
counter-intuitive.
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2. Given the definitions of P, Q, and K above, it
follows that K |=4 P  Q and K |=4 Q P.
K is designated on v, and so both (P  Q)
and (Q P) are designated on v. Yet v(P) =
1 and v(Q) = b, and so Strong Equivalence is
not satisfied.
3. As in 1 above, K |=4 P  Q and K |=4 ¬Q.
If K |=4 ¬Q  ¬P, then by Modus Po-
nens, K |=4 ¬P. However, K is designated
on v but v(¬P) = 0, and so it can’t be that
K |=4 ¬Q  ¬P. Consequently, Transposi-
tion is not satisfied.
Observe that it does not matter whether  is
Supraclassical or satisfies Identity. Furthermore,
only in the counterexample for Transposition is
Modus Ponens actually used.
A.2. SROIQ4
Proof of Proposition 17. For any SROIQ4 con-
cepts C, D and 4-interpretation I, the following
hold:
1. (¬>)I = ⊥I
2. (¬⊥)I = >I
3. (¬¬C)I = CI
4. (¬(C uD))I = (¬C unionsq ¬D)I
5. (¬(C unionsqD))I = (¬C u ¬D)I
6. (¬∃R.C)I = (∀R.¬C)I
7. (¬∀R.C)I = (∃R.¬C)I
8. (¬ ≤ nR.C)I = (≥ n+ 1R.C)I
9. (¬ ≥ nR.C)I = (≤ n− 1R.C)I
Proof. We show selected cases.
1.1. p+((¬>)I) = p−(>I) = ∅ = p+(⊥I)
1.2. p−((¬>)I) = p+(>I) = ∆I = p−(⊥I)
3.1. p+((¬¬C)I) = p−((¬C)I) = p+(CI).
3.2. p−((¬¬C)I) = p+((¬C)I) = p−(CI).
4.1. p+((¬(C uD))I) = p−((C uD)I) =
p−(CI)∪ p−(DI) = p+((¬C)I)∪ p+((¬D)I)
= p+((¬C unionsq ¬D)I)
4.2. p−((¬(C uD))I) = p+((C uD)I) =
p+(CI)∩ p+(DI) = p−((¬C)I)∩ p−((¬D)I)
= p−((¬C unionsq ¬D)I)
6.1. p+((¬∃R.C)I) = p−((∃R.C)I) =
{x|(∀y)[(x, y) ∈ p+(RI) 7→y ∈ p−(CI)]}
= {x|(∀y)[(x, y)∈ p+(RI)7→y ∈ p+((¬C)I)]}
= p+((∀R.¬C)I)
6.2. p−((¬∃R.C)I) = p+((∃R.C)I) =
{x|(∃y)[(x, y) ∈ p+(RI) ∧ y ∈ p+(CI)]} =
{x|(∃y)[(x, y)∈ p+(RI) ∧ y ∈ p−((¬C)I)]} =
p−((∀R.¬C)I)
8.1. p+((¬ ≤ nR.C)I) = p−((≤ nR.C)I) =
{x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ p+(RI) ∧ y ∈ p+(CI)} > n}
= {x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ p+(RI) ∧ y ∈ p+(CI)} ≥
(n+ 1)} = p+((≥ (n+ 1)R.C)I)
8.2. p−((¬ ≤ nR.C)I) = p+((≤ nR.C)I) =
{x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ p+(RI) ∧ y /∈ p−(CI)} ≤ n}
= {x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ p+(RI) ∧ y /∈ p−(CI)} <
(n+ 1)} = p−((≥ (n+ 1)R.C)I)
Proof of Proposition 20. Let C andD be SROIQ4
concepts.
1. C is weakly subsumed by D iff C @ D is
satisfied on each I.
2. C is strongly subsumed by D iff C → D is
satisfied on each I.
3. C and D are weakly equivalent iff C @ D and
D @ C are both satisfied on each I.
4. C and D are strongly equivalent iff C → D
and D → C are both satisfied on each I.
Proof.
1. This follows directly from the definition of
weak subsumption and satisfaction C @ D.
2. Again, this follows by definition of strong sub-
sumption and satisfaction C → D.
3. If (C ↔ D), then for any I, CI = DI , and
so p+(CI) ⊆ p+(DI) and p−(DI) ⊆ p−(CI),
and p+(DI) ⊆ p+(CI) and p−(CI) ⊆
p−(DI). Both (C → D) and (D → C)
are satisfied by I. If (C → D) and (D →
C) are satisfied by I, then by definition,
p+(CI) ⊆ p+(DI) and p−(DI) ⊆ p−(CI),
and p+(DI) ⊆ p+(CI) and p−(CI) ⊆
p−(DI). Hence, CI = DI . Generalizing on I,
(C ↔ D).
4. Clearly, p+(CI) = p+(DI) iff p+(CI) ⊆
p+(DI) and p+(DI) ⊆ p+(CI).
Below, ∆ refers to the domain of discourse shared
by both I4 and I2.
Proof of Proposition 21. If I2 is a 2-interpretation
and I4 its 4-counterpart, then for any concept C
CI4 = 〈CI2 ,∆− CI2〉.
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Proof. We induct on the degree of C. If C ∈ NC ∪
No or C = ∃R.Self , the claim holds by definition.
For >, p+(>I4) = ∆ = >I2 and p−(>I4) = ∅ =
∆ − ∆ = ∆ − >I2 . For bottom, p+(⊥I4) = ∅ =
⊥I2 and p−(⊥I4) = ∆ = ∆ − ∅ = ∆ − ⊥I2 . For
the inductive cases, suppose the claim holds for
all concepts of degree < n and that C has degree
n. We consider the cases where C is one of ¬D,
(D u E), (∃R.D), or (≥ nR.D). The remaining
cases are similar.
– (¬D)I4 = 〈p−(DI4), p+(DI4)〉 =
〈∆−DI2 , DI2)〉 = 〈(¬D)I2 ,∆− (¬D)I2)〉.
– (D uE)I4 =
〈(p+(DI4) ∩ p+(EI4)), (p−(DI4) ∪ p−(EI4))〉
= 〈(DI2 ∩ EI2), ((∆−DI2) ∪ (∆− EI2))〉
= 〈(DI2 ∩ EI2), (∆− (DI2 ∩ EI2))〉.
– (∃R.D)I4 = 〈P,N〉, where
P = {x|(∃y)[(x, y) ∈ p+(RI4)∧y ∈ p+(DI4)]}
= {x|(∃y)[(x, y) ∈ RI2 ∧ y ∈ DI2 ]} =
(∃R.D)I2 ; and N =
{x|(∀y)[(x, y) ∈ p+(RI4) 7→y ∈ p−(DI4)]}
= {x|(∀y)[(x, y) ∈ RI2 7→y ∈ (∆ − DI2)]}
= {x|(∀y)[(x, y) ∈ RI2 7→y /∈ DI2 ]} =
{x|¬¬(∀y)[(x, y) ∈ RI2 7→y /∈ DI2 ]} =
{x|¬(∃y)[(x, y) ∈ RI2 ∧ y ∈ DI2 ]} = ∆ −
(∃R.D)I2 .
– (≥ nR.D)I4 = 〈P,N〉, where P =
{x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ p+(RI4) ∧ y ∈ p+(DI4)} ≥ n}
= {x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ RI2 ∧ y ∈ DI2} ≥ n} =
DI2 ; and N =
{x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ p+(RI4) ∧ y /∈ p−(DI4)} < n}
= {x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ p+(RI4) ∧ y ∈ p+(DI4)} <
n} = {x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ RI2 ∧ y ∈ DI2} < n}
= ∆− (≥ nR.D)I2 .
The below two lemmas are needed to prove
Proposition 22, which relates the 2-models of an
axiom A to its 4-models.
Lemma 61. Let I2 be a 2-interpretation and I4
its 4-counterpart. If R ∈ NR, then R−I4 =
〈R−I2 ,∆2 −R−I2〉.
Proof. By definition of I4, RI4 = 〈RI2 , ∆2−RI2〉.
From this, R−I4 = 〈R−I2 , (∆2−RI2)−〉. Observe
that (∆2−RI2)− = (∆2)−−(RI2)− = ∆2−R−I2 .
And so R−I4 = 〈R−I2 ,∆2 −R−I2)〉.
Lemma 62. If I2 is a 2-interpretation and I4 its
4-counterpart, then for roles R1, . . . , Rn, (R1◦. . .◦
Rn)
I4 = 〈(R1 ◦ . . .◦Rn)I2 ,∆2− (R1 ◦ . . .◦Rn)I2〉.
Proof. That p+((R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn)I4) = (R1 ◦ . . . ◦
Rn)
I2 and p−((R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn)I4) = ∆2− (R1 ◦ . . .◦
Rn)
I2 follows by definition of I4 for roles and
Lemma 61.
Proof of Proposition 22. If I2 is a 2-interpretation
and I4 its 4-counterpart, then for any axiom A, I4
is a 4-model of A iff I2 is a 2-model of A.
Proof. (By cases):
– A = C(a): I4 is a 4-model of C(a) iff aI4 ∈
p+(CI4) iff aI2 ∈ CI2 iff I2 is a 2-model of
C(a).
– A = R(a,b): I4 is a 4-model of R(a, b) iff
(aI4 , bI4) ∈ p+(RI4) iff
(aI2 , bI2) ∈ RI2 iff I2 is a 2-model of R(a, b).
– A = ¬R(a,b): I4 is a 4-model of ¬R(a, b) iff
(aI4 , bI4) ∈ p−(RI4) iff
(aI2 , bI2) /∈ RI2 iff I2 is a 2-model of
¬R(a, b).
– A = C @ D: I4 is a 4-model of (C @ D) iff
p+(CI4) ⊆ p+(DI4) iff CI2 ⊆ DI2 iff I2 is a
2-model of C @ D.
– A = C 7→ D: I4 is a 4-model of (C 7→ D)
iff ∆ − p−(CI4) ⊆ p+(DI4) iff p+(CI4) ⊆
p+(DI4) iff CI2 ⊆ DI2 iff I2 is a 2-model of
C 7→ D.
– A = C→ D: I4 is a 4-model of (C → D)
iff (p+(CI4) ⊆ p+(DI4) and p−(DI4) ⊆
p−(CI4)) iff (CI2 ⊆ DI2 and ∆−p−(CI4) ⊆
∆−p−(DI4)) iff (CI2 ⊆ DI2 and CI2 ⊆ DI2)
iff I2 is a 2-model of C → D.
– A = R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn @ Rn+1: I4 is a 4-model of
R1 ◦ . . .◦Rn @ Rn+1 iff p+((R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn)I4)
⊆ p+(RI4n+1) iff (R1 ◦ . . . ◦ Rn)I2 ⊆ RI2n+1 iff
I2 is a 2-model of R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn @ Rn+1.
– A = Ref(R): I4 is a 4-model of Ref(R) iff
{(x, x)|x ∈ ∆} ⊆ p+((RI4)) iff {(x, x)|x ∈
∆} ⊆ RI2 iff I2 is a 2-model of Ref(R).
– A = Irr(R): I4 is a 4-model of Irr(R) iff
{(x, x)|x ∈ ∆} ⊆ p−((RI4)) iff {(x, x)|x ∈
∆} ⊆ (∆×∆)−RI2 iff {(x, x)|x ∈ ∆}∩RI2 =
∅ iff I2 is a 2-model of Irr(R).
– A = Dis(R,S): I4 is a 4-model of Dis(R,S)
iff (p+(RI4) ⊆ p−(SI4) and p+(SI4) ⊆
p−(RI4))iff (RI2 ⊆ ∆2 − SI2 and SI2 ⊆
∆2−RI2) iff RI2∩SI2 = ∅ iff I2 is a 2-model
of Dis(R,S).
Since (in)equality assertions have the same se-
mantics in both 2-interpretations and 4-interpre-
tations, we need show nothing for them.
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A.3. Removing Gaps and Gluts
Proof of Proposition 30. A 4-valued interpretation
I of EM(KB) is a 4-model of EM(KB) iff for
each concept C of KB, p+(CI) ∪ p−(CI) = ∆I .
Proof. (LR) Let I 4-model EM(KB). We induct
on the degree of the concept C. For C = > and
C = ⊥, the claim holds by definition of > and ⊥.
If C ∈ NC ∪No or has the form ∃R.Self , since I
4-satisfies EM(KB), ∆I ⊆ p+(CI) ∪ p+((¬C)I).
Since p+(CI) ∪ p+((¬C)I) ⊆ ∆I , the claim must
hold. For the inductive cases, suppose the claim
holds for concepts of degree < n and that C has
degree n. We consider selective cases. Proofs for
the cases left out are analogous.
1. C = (D uE): If d /∈ p+(CI), then d /∈
p+(DI) or d /∈ p+(EI). By ind. hyp., d ∈
p−(DI) or d ∈ p−(EI), and so d ∈ p−((D u
E)I). I.e., d ∈ p−(CI).
2. C = (∀R.D): If d /∈ p+(CI), then there ex-
ists a d′ such that (d, d′) ∈ p+(RI) and d′ /∈
p+(DI). But then by ind. hyp., d′ ∈ p−(DI),
and so d ∈ p−(CI).
3. C = (≤ nR.D): If d /∈ p+(CI), then
]{y|(d, y) ∈ p+(RI)∧ y /∈ p−(DI)} > n}. But
then by ind. hyp., ]{y|(d, y) ∈ p+(RI) ∧ y ∈
p+(DI)} > n}, and so d ∈ p−(CI).
(RL) Suppose for each concept C, p+(CI) ∪
p−(CI) = ∆I . Then p+(CI) ∪ p+((¬C)I) = ∆I ,
∆ ⊆ p+(CI) ∪ p+((¬C)I), and so p+(>I) ⊆
p+((C unionsq ¬C)I). I is a 4-model of > @ (C unionsq ¬C).
Generalizing on C, I is a 4-model of EM(KB).
Proof of Proposition 31. A 4-valued interpretation
I of EFQ(KB) is a 4-model of EFQ(KB) iff for
each concept C of KB, p+(CI) ∩ p−(CI) = ∅.
Proof. (LR) Suppose I 4-satisfies EFQ(KB). We
induct on the degree of C. For C = > and C = ⊥,
the claim holds by definition. If C ∈ NC ∪ No or
has the form ∃R.Self , (C u ¬C) @ ⊥ is satisfied,
and so p+(CI) ∩ p+(¬C)I) ⊆ ∅. However, ∅ ⊆
p+(CI)∩p+(¬C)I), and so p+(CI)∩p−(CI) = ∅.
For the inductive cases, suppose the claim holds
for concepts of degree < n and that C has degree
n. We again consider selected cases.
1. If d ∈ p+((D unionsqE)I), then d ∈ p+(DI) or
d ∈ p+(EI). By ind. hyp., d /∈ p−(DI) or
d /∈ p−(EI), and so d /∈ p−((D unionsq E)I).
2. If d ∈ p+((∃R.D)I), then there is a d′ such
that (d, d′) ∈ p+(RI) and d′ ∈ p+(DI). How-
ever, by ind. hyp., d′ /∈ p−(DI). And so
d /∈ p−((∃R.D)I).
3. If d ∈ p−((≤ nR.D)I), then ]{y|(d, y) ∈
p+(RI) ∧ y ∈ p+(DI)} > n. By ind. hyp.,
]{y|(d, y) ∈ p+(RI) ∧ y /∈ p−(DI)} > n, and
so d /∈ p+((≤ nR.D)I).
(RL) If p+(CI) ∩ p−(CI) = ∅, then p+(CI) ∩
p+((¬C)I) = ∅, p+((C u ¬C)I) = ∅, and so
(C u ¬C) v ⊥ is satisfied by I. Generalizing, I
4-satisfies EFQ(KB).
Proof of Proposition 32. I4 4-satisfies
EM(KB) ∪ EFQ(KB)
iff for each concept C, CI4 = 〈CI2 ,∆− CI2〉.
Proof. (LR) Suppose I4 4-satisfies EM(KB) ∪
EFQ(KB). Let C be a concept of KB. In virtue
of Props. 30 and 31, ∆− p+(CI4) = p−(CI4). In-
ducting on the degree of C, we show that CI4 =
〈CI2 ,∆−CI2〉. We consider two cases below, both
requiring that ∆ − p+(CI4) = p−(CI4). Other
cases are similar.
1. p+((¬C)I4) = p−(CI4) = ∆−CI2 = (¬C)I2 .
So, ∆− (¬C)I2 = p−((¬C)I4).
2. p+((≤ nR.C)I4) = {x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ p+(RI4)∧
y /∈ p−(CI4)} ≤ n} =
{x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ RI2 ∧ y ∈ p+(CI4)} ≤ n}
= {x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ RI2 ∧ y ∈ CI2} ≤ n} =
(≤ nR.C)I2 . And so ∆−(≤ nR.C)I2 = p−((≤
nR.C)I4).
(RL) If CI4 = 〈CI2 ,∆− CI2〉, then
∆ ⊆ (p+(CI4) ∪ p+(¬CI4)) and (p+(CI4) ∩
p+((¬C)I4)) ⊆ ∅. As such, I4 4-satisfies > @
(C unionsq ¬C) and (C u ¬C) @ ⊥.
Proof of Proposition 33. Let I4 be a 4-model of
EM(KB)∪EFQ(KB). If A is a SROIQ4 axiom
of KB and not of the form ¬R(a, b), Irr(R), or
Dis(R,S), then I2 is a 2-model of A iff I4 is a
4-model of A.
Proof. We treat each case:
– I4 4-satisfies (C @ D) (or C v D) iff
p+(CI4) ⊆ p+(DI4) iff CI2 ⊆ DI2 .
– I4 4-satisfies (C 7→ D) iff ∆ − p−(CI4) ⊆
p+(DI4) iff p+(CI4) ⊆ p+(DI4) iff CI2 ⊆
DI2 .
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– I4 4-satisfies (C→ D) iff (p+(CI4) ⊆
p+(DI4) and p−(DI4) ⊆ p−(CI4)) iff (CI2 ⊆
DI2 and ∆−DI2 ⊆ ∆−CI2) iff CI2 ⊆ DI2 .
– I4 4-satisfies R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn @ Rn+1 iff
p+((R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn)I4) ⊆ p+(RI4n+1) iff (R1 ◦
. . . ◦Rn)I2 ⊆ RI2n+1.
– I4 4-satisfies Ref(R) iff {(x, x)|x ∈ ∆} ⊆
p+(RI4) iff {(x, x)|x ∈ ∆} ⊆ RI2 .
– I4 4-satisfies C(a) iff aI4 ∈ p+(CI4) iff aI2 ∈
CI2 .
– I4 4-satisfies R(a,b) iff (aI4 , bI4) ∈ p+(RI4)
iff (aI2 , bI2) ∈ RI2 .
Since (in)equalities are treated the same in the
logics, we need not consider them.
Proof of Proposition 34. If KB is a SROIQ4
knowledge base lacking axioms of the form Irr(R),
Dis(R,S), or ¬R(a, b) then KB ∪ EM(KB) ∪
EFQ(KB) has a 4-model iff KB has a 2-model.
Proof. (LR) Let I4 4-model KB ∪ EM(KB) ∪
EFQ(KB). Prop. 33 applies, and so I2 (as de-
scribed above) 2-satisfies KB. (RL) Let I2 be any
2-model of KB. We may define a 4-counterpart
I4 as in Section 3. By Proposition 22, for any
SROIQ axiom A of KB, I2 2-satisfies A iff I4
4-satisfies A. And so I4 4-satisfies KB. Clearly,
in any 2-interpretation, every axiom of EM(KB)
and EFQ(KB) is satisfied. Again by Proposition
22, I4 4-satisfies EM(KB), EFQ(KB).
A.4. From SROIQ4 to SROIQ
Proposition 37. For any 4-interpretation I, primed
counterpart I ′, and SROIQ4 concept C,
1. p+((C)I) = pi(C)I
′
2. p−((C)I) = pi(¬C)I′
Proof. We induct on the degree of C. If C is
atomic, then pi(C) = C, and by definition p+(CI)
= CI
′
= pi(C)I
′
and p−(CI) = C ′I
′
= pi(¬C)I′ .
If C = ∃R.Self , then pi(∃R.Self) = ∃R.Self , and
by definition (∃R.Self)I′ = p+((∃R.Self)I). Fur-
thermore, pi(¬∃R.Self) = CR.Self , and by def-
inition (CR.Self )
I′ = p−((∃R.Self)I). If C ∈
No, then pi(o) = o, and by definition o
I′ =
p+(oI). Furthermore, pi(¬o) = Co, and by defini-
tion (Co)
I′ = p−(oI).
For the induction, we consider selected cases
(the others are similar).
1. p+((D unionsqE)I) = p+(D) ∪ p+(E) = pi(D)I′ ∪
pi(E)I
′
= (pi(D) unionsq pi(E))I′ = pi(D unionsq E)I′ .
p−((D unionsqE)I) = p−(D)∩p−(E) = pi(¬D)I′ ∩
pi(¬E)I′ = (pi(¬D) u pi(¬E))I′ = (pi(¬(D unionsq
E))I
′
.
2. p+((∃R.D)I) = {x|(∃y)[(x, y) ∈ p+(RI) ∧
y ∈ p+(DI)]} = {x|(∃y)[(x, y) ∈ RI′ ∧ y ∈
(pi(D))I
′
]} = (∃R.pi(D))I′ = (pi(∃R.D))I′ .
p−((∃R.D)I) =
{x|(∀y)[(x, y) ∈ p+(RI)7→y ∈ p−(DI)]} =
{x|(∀y)[(x, y) ∈ RI′ 7→y ∈ (pi(¬D))I′ ]} =
(∀R.pi(¬D))I′ = (pi(¬∃R.D))I′ .
3. p+((≤ nR.D)I) = {x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ p+(RI) ∧
y /∈ p−(DI)} ≤ n} =
{x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ RI′ ∧ y /∈ pi(¬D)I′} ≤ n} =
{x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ RI′∧y ∈ (∆−pi(¬D)I′)} ≤ n}
= {x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ RI′∧y ∈ (¬pi(¬D))I′} ≤ n}
= (≤ nR.¬pi(¬D))I′ = (pi(≤ nR.D))I′ .
p−((≤ nR.D)I) = {x|]{y|(x, y) ∈ p+(RI) ∧
y ∈ p+(DI)} ≥ (n + 1)} = {x|]{y|(x, y) ∈
RI
′ ∧ y ∈ pi(D)I′} ≥ (n + 1)} = (≥ (n +
1)R.pi(D))I
′
= (pi(¬ ≤ nR.D))I′ .
The remaining cases, involving negation, all
have the same form:
4. p+((¬D)I) = p−(DI) = pi((¬D))I′ .
p−((¬D)I) = p+(DI) = pi(D)I′ = pi(¬¬D)I′ .
The below two lemmas are needed for the proof
of Proposition 38.
Lemma 63. For any 4-interpretation I and primed
counterpart I ′, if S is the inverse of a role name
R, then p+(SI) = SI
′
,
Proof. If (a, b) ∈ p+(SI), then (b, a) ∈ p+(RI). As
such, (b, a) ∈ RI′ , and so (a, b) ∈ SI′ . If (a, b) ∈
SI
′
, then (b, a) ∈ RI′ , and so both (b, a) ∈ p+(RI)
and (a, b) ∈ p+(SI).
Lemma 64. For any 4-interpretation I and primed
counterpart I ′,
p+((R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn)I) = (R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn)I′ .
Proof. (LR) If (x, z) ∈ p+((R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn)I), then
there are y1, . . . , yn−1 such that (x, y1) ∈ p+(RI1 ),
(y1, y2) ∈ p+(RI2 ), . . ., (yn−1, z) ∈ p+(RIn). Ob-
serve that for each Ri, p
+(RIi ) = R
I′
i by defini-
tion of I ′. And so (x, y1) ∈ RI
′
1 , (y1, y2) ∈ RI
′
2 ,
. . ., (yn−1, z) ∈ RI
′
n . As such, (x, z) ∈ (R1 ◦
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. . . ◦ Rn)I′ . (RL) Suppose (x, z) ∈ (R1 ◦ . . . ◦
Rn)
I′ . Then there exist y1, . . . , yn−1 such that
(x, y1) ∈ RI
′
1 , (y1, y2) ∈ RI
′
2 , . . ., (yn−1, z) ∈
R
I′
n . For each Ri, p
+(RIi ) = R
I′
i by defini-
tion of I ′. And so (x, y1) ∈ p+(RI1 ), (y1, y2) ∈
p+(RI2 ), . . ., (yn−1, z) ∈ p+(RIn). As such, (x, z) ∈
p+((R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn)I).
Proposition 38. For any 4-interpretation I, I is
a 4-model of SROIQ4 axiom A iff its primed
counterpart I ′ is a 2-model of pi(A).
Proof. (By cases):
1. C(a): pi(C(a)) = pi(C)(a). By Prop. 37, aI ∈
p+(CI) iff aI
′ ∈ pi(C)I′ .
2. A = R(a,b). pi(R(a, b)) = R(a, b). Since
p+(RI) = RI
′
and (aI , bI) = (aI
′
, bI
′
),
(aI , bI) ∈ p+(RI) iff (aI′ , bI′) ∈ RI′ .
3. A = ¬R(a,b). pi(¬R(a, b)) = R′(a, b). Since
p−(RI) = R′I
′
and (aI , bI) = (aI
′
, bI
′
),
(aI , bI) ∈ p+((¬R)I) iff (aI′ , bI′) ∈ R′I′ .
4. A = (C @ D):
p+(CI) ⊆ p+(DI) iff pi(C)I′ ⊆ pi(D)I′ iff
I ′ 2-satisfies (pi(C) @ pi(D)) iff I ′ 2-satisfies
pi(C @ D).
5. A = (C→ D): (p+(CI) ⊆ p+(DI) and
p−(DI) ⊆ p−(CI)) iff (pi(C)I′ ⊆ pi(D)I′
and pi(¬D)I′ ⊆ pi(¬C)I′) iff (I ′ 2-satisfies
{pi(C) v pi(D), pi(¬D) v pi(¬C)} iff I ′ 2-
satisfies pi(C → D).
6. A = (C 7→ D): (∆ − p−(CI)) ⊆ p+(DI) iff
(∆ − pi(¬C)I′) ⊆ pi(D)I′ iff (¬pi(¬C))I′ ⊆
pi(D)I
′
iff I ′ 2-satisfies (¬pi(¬C) v pi(D)) iff
I ′ 2-satisfies pi(C 7→ D).
7. R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn @ Rn+1: I 4-satisfies R1 ◦ . . . ◦
Rn @ Rn+1 iff
p+((R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn)I) ⊆ p+(RIn+1) iff (R1 ◦
. . . ◦Rn)I′ ⊆ RI
′
n+1 iff I ′ 2-satisfies R1 ◦ . . . ◦
Rn v Rn+1 iff I ′ 2-satisfies pi(R1 ◦ . . . ◦Rn @
Rn+1).
8. A = Ref(R):I 4-satisfies Ref(R) iff
{(x, x)|x ∈ ∆} ⊆ p+(RI) iff
{(x, x)|x ∈ ∆} ⊆ RI′ iff I ′ 2-satisfies Ref(R)
iff I ′ 2-satisfies pi(Ref(R)).
9. A = Irr(R): I 4-satisfies Irr(R) iff
{(x, x)|x ∈ ∆} ⊆ p−(RI) iff
{(x, x)|x ∈ ∆} ⊆ R′I′ iff I ′ 2-satisfies
Ref(R′) iff I ′ 2-satisfies pi(Irr(R)).
10. A = Dis(R,S): I 4-satisfies Dis(R,S) iff
(p+(RI) ⊆ p−(SI) and p+(SI) ⊆ p−(RI))
iff (RI
′ ⊆ S′I′ and SI′ ⊆ R′I′) iff I ′ 2-
satisfies R @ S′ and S @ R′ iff I ′ 2-satisfies
pi(Dis(R,S)).
Proposition 39 Let KB be a SROIQ4 knowledge
base. For any SROIQ4 axiom A:
KB |=SROIQ4 A iff pi(KB) |=SROIQ pi(A).
Proof. (LR) Suppose KB |=SROIQ4 A and let
I ′ 2-satisfy pi(KB). Assume wlog that I ′ is
the primed-counterpart of 4-interpretation I of
KB. Since I ′ 2-satisfies pi(KB), by Prop. 38
I 4-satisfies KB and hence A. By Prop. 38,
I ′ 2-satisfies pi(A). Generalizing on I ′, it fol-
lows that pi(KB) |=SROIQ pi(A). (RL) Suppose
pi(KB) |=SROIQ pi(A) and that I 4-satisfies KB.
Then there is a 2-interpretation I ′ that is the
primed-counterpart of I. By Prop. 38, since I 4-
satisfies KB, I ′ 2-satisfies pi(KB) and so pi(A).
By Prop 38, I 4-satisfies A. Generalizing on I,
KB |=SROIQ4 A.
A.5. Tractable DLs
Proof of Proposition 49. Let KB ∪ {A} be a set
of Horn-SHOIQ◦ assertions, with all GCIs being
@-axioms. If piHorn(pi(KB)) |=2 piHorn(pi(A)), then
pi(KB) |=2 pi(A).
Proof. Suppose piHorn(pi(KB)) |=2 piHorn(pi(A))
and let I be a model of pi(KB). Since B= does
not appear in pi(KB), we may define a new in-
terpretation I ′ by extending I with B=I′ =
(¬B′)I . Clearly, I ′ models every axiom of the
form B= u B′ v ⊥. Furthermore, since B=I′ =
(¬B′)I , the interpretations of each concept de-
scription in pi(KB) and corresponding descrip-
tion in piHorn(pi(KB)) is the same, and so I ′ 2-
satisfies piHorn(pi(KB)). Since piHorn(pi(KB)) |=2
piHorn(pi(A)), I ′ 2-satisfies piHorn(pi(A)). However,
since the interpretations of each concept descrip-
tion in pi(A) and corresponding description in
piHorn(pi(A)) are the same, I 2-satisfies pi(A).
Proof of Proposition 50. Every DL-Litecore and
DL-LiteR knowledge base is 4-satisfiable.
Proof. Let ∆I = {d}. Let CI = 〈{d}, {d}〉 for each
C ∈ NC , and let aI = d for each a ∈ NI . For
each role R, let RI = 〈{(d, d)}, {(d, d)}〉. Observe
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that for each C ∈ NC , CI = (¬C)I , and for each
role R, (¬R)I = RI , and (∃R)I = (¬∃R)I =
〈{d}, {d}〉. It is clear that each GCI, RIA, class
assertion, and role assertion is 4-satisfied.
For the remaining proofs about DL-Lite, we ab-
breviate piLite to pi. Let I be a four-valued in-
terpretation. In order to accommodate the modi-
fied paraconsistent semantics for DL-Lite and its
translation, we extend the definition of the primed
counterpart I ′ of I: For each role R ∈ NR ∪N−R ,
R=I
′
=def ∆− p−(RI).
Lemma 65. For any 4-interpretation I, primed
counterpart I ′, and DL-Lite concept C, p+((C)I)
= pi(C)I
′
, and p−((C)I) = pi(¬C)I′ .
Proof. The cases for atomic concepts A and their
negations ¬A proceed as for SROIQ4 (see Propo-
sition 37). We need only consider ∃R and ¬∃R.
1. If C = ∃R, then pi(∃R) = ∃R.
(a) p+((∃R)I) = {x|(∃y)[(x, y) ∈ p+(RI)]}.
However, p+(RI) = RI
′
, and so
p+((∃A)I) = (∃R)I′ = pi(∃R)I′ .
(b) p−((∃R)I) = {x|(∀y)[(x, y) ∈ p−(RI)]}.
However, R=I
′
= ∆ − p−(RI), and so
p−((∃R)I) = {x|(∀y)[(x, y) /∈ R=I′ ]}.
So, p−((∃R)I) = (¬∃R=)I′ = pi(¬∃R)I′ .
2. If C = ¬∃R, then pi(¬∃R) = ¬∃R=.
(a) p+((¬∃R)I) = p−((∃R)I) =
{x|(∀y)[(x, y) ∈ p−(RI)]}. Since R=I′ =
∆− p−(RI), it follows that p+((¬∃R)I)
= {x|(∀y)[(x, y) /∈ R=I′ ]}. And so
p+((¬∃R)I) = (¬∃R=)I′ .
(b) p−((¬∃R)I) = {x|(∃y)[(x, y)∈p+(RI)]}.
However, p+(RI) = RI
′
, so p−((¬∃R)I)
= (∃R)I′=pi(∃R)I′=pi(¬¬∃R)I′ .
Lemma 66. Let I be a 4-interpretation and I ′ its
2-counterpart. I is a 4-model of DL-Lite axiom A
iff I ′ is a 2-model of pi(X).
Proof. For axioms of the form C(a), R(a, b), C @
D, C → D, C 7→ D, the proof for Proposition 38
can be used (with Lemma 65 substituted appro-
priately). The cases for RIAs are given below.
1. A = (R @ S): I 4-satisfies R @ S iff
p+(RI) ⊆ p+(SI) iff RI′ ⊆ SI′ iff I ′ 2-
satisfies R v S iff I ′ 2-satisfies pi(R @ S).
2. A = (R @ ¬S): I 4-satisfies R @ ¬S iff
p+(RI) ⊆ p−(SI) iff RI′ ⊆ S′I′ iff I ′ 2-
satisfies R v S′ iff I ′ 2-satisfies pi(R @ ¬S).
Proof of Proposition 52. For any DL-Lite ontology
KB,
KB |=4 A iff piLite(KB) |=DL-LiteR piLite(A).
Proof. (LR) Suppose KB |=4 A and let I1 be
a 2-model of pi(KB). For each role R, R=I1 ⊆
∆ − R′I1 . Since R′ can only appear on the right-
hand side of an axiom of the form S v R′, I1
can be extended to a 2-model I ′ of pi(KB) such
that R=I
′
= ∆−R′I1 . Since I ′ 2-satisfies pi(KB),
then by Lemma 66, I 4-satisfies KB. And so I
4-satisfies A. As such, I ′ 2-satisfies pi(A). We now
show I1 2-satisfies pi(A), considering the form of
A.
If A is C(a), R(a, b), GCI C @ D, RIA C @ ∃R,
or RIA R v S, where R is atomic and C, D, and S
are atomic or simple negations, then since I and I1
differ only in the extension of R= and R= doesn’t
appear in pi(A), I1 2-satisfies pi(A).
If A = C @ ¬∃R, then pi(A) = pi(C) @ ¬∃R=,
and so pi(C)I
′ ⊆ (¬∃R=)I′ . Note that pi(C)I′ =
pi(C)I1 . Since R=I
′
= ∆ − R′I1 , {x|(∀y)[(x, y) /∈
R=I
′
]} is a subset of {x|(∀y)[(x, y) /∈ R=I1 ]}. From
this, (¬∃R=)I′ ⊆ (¬∃R=)I1 . As such, pi(C)I1 ⊆
(¬∃R=)I1 , and so I1 2-satisfies pi(C @ ¬∃R).
(RL) Suppose pi(KB) |= pi(A) and I 4-satisfies
KB. I corresponds to a 2-interpretation I ′ of
pi(KB∪{A}). By Lemma 66, I ′ 2-satisfies pi(KB)
and hence pi(A). By Lemma 66, I 4-satisfies A.
A.6. ELP
Proof of Proposition 57. Let KB be a ⊃-rule base
and KB′ the result of applying one of H1,. . .,H4,
B1,. . .,B3 to KB. KB is 4-satisfiable iff KB′ is.
Proof. H2, H3, and B2 are trivial enough to omit.
We consider the other cases. Let r and r′ denote
the old and new rules, respectively. KB′ poten-
tially introduces new variables and atomic con-
cepts. However, each interpretation for KB′ ex-
tends one for KB, and each interpretation for KB
can be extended into one for KB′.
H1: Since body(r) = body(r′), I, σI 6|=t body(r) iff
I, σI 6|=t body(r′). Obviously,
tI ∈ p+((C uD)I) iff I, σI |=t (C(t)∧D(t)).
The rest of head(r′) is unchanged from r, and
so I, σI |=t head(r) iff I, σI |=t head(r′). So,
I, σI |=t r iff I, σI |=t r′.
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H4: Let s = A(x) ⊃ C(x) be the axiom added.
(LR) Suppose I, σI |=t r, and let I ′ be ob-
tained by extending I so that AI′ = CI
(ensuring I ′, σI′ |=t s). Since AI′ = CI ,
it must be that I, σI |=t r′. (RL) Suppose
I, σI |=t r′ and I, σI |=t s for some I. If
I, σI 6|=t body(r′), then I, σI |=t r. If I, σI |=t
head(r′), then I, σI |=t ∃R.A(t), and since
I, σI |=t s, it follows that I, σI |=t ∃R.C(t).
Since the rest of head(r′) matches head(r),
I, σI |=t head(r), and so I, σI |=t r.
B1: Suppose I, σI |=t r. Then either I, σI 6|=t
body(r) or else I, σI |=t head(r). If I, σI |=t
head(r), then I, σI |=t head(r′), and so
I, σI |=t r′. If I, σI 6|=t body(r), then I, σI 6|=t
A for some A ∈ body(r). If A ∈ body(r′),
then I, σI 6|=t body(r′). If A /∈ body(r′), then
A = (CuD)(t). As such, either I, σI 6|=t C(t)
or else I, σI 6|=t D(t). Either way, I, σI 6|=t
C(t) ∧D(t). And so I, σI 6|=t body(r′), which
implies I, σI |=t r′.
The other direction proceeds similarly.
B3: head(r) = head(r′), and so I, σI |=t head(r)
iff I, σI |=t head(r′). We consider the bod-
ies: (LR) Suppose I, σI 6|=t body(r). If this
is due to an unrelated atom (not ∃R.C(t)),
then I, σI 6|=t body(r′). So suppose I, σI 6|=t
∃R.C(t). By definition, tI /∈ {z|(∃y)[(z, y) ∈
p+(RI) and y ∈ p+(CI)]}. So for all d ∈ ∆I ,
either (tI , d) /∈ p+(RI) or else d /∈ p+(CI).
In other words, for all d, either I, σI [x/d] 6|=t
C(x) or else I, σI [x/d] 6|=t R(t, x). Either
way, I, σI 6|=t body(r′). (RL) Now suppose
I, σI 6|=t body(r′), and assume that for all
d ∈ ∆I , either I, σI [x/d] 6|=t C(x) or else
I, σI [x/d] 6|=t R(t, x). Either way, I, σI 6|=t
∃R.C. And so I, σI 6|=t body(r).
Proof of Proposition 58. If P is a well-formed for-
mula of ELP, I is a 4-interpretation of P, and I ′
is the primed counterpart of I, then for any as-
signment σI , I, σI |=t P iff I, σI′ |= pi(P).
Proof. Let I be a 4-interpretation and I ′ its
primed counterpart. We induct on the degree of
P, considering selected cases. The rest are similar.
1. C(t): I, σI |=t C(t) iff σI(t) ∈ p+(CI) iff
σI(t) ∈ pi(C)I′ iff I ′, σI |= pi(C)(t).
2. ¬R(t1, t2): I, σI |=t ¬R(t1, t2) iff
(σI(t1), σI(t2)) ∈ p−(RI) iff
(σI(t1), σI(t2)) ∈ R′I iff (σI(t1), σI(t2)) ∈
pi(¬R)I′ iff I ′, σI |= pi(¬R)(t1, t2).
3. (P ∧Q): I, σI |=t (P∧Q) iff (I, σI |=t P and
I, σI |=t Q) iff (I ′, σI |= pi(P) and I, σI′ |=t
pi(Q)) iff I ′, σI |= pi(P ∧Q).
4. (P ⊃ Q): I, σI |=t (P ⊃ Q) iff (I, σI 6|=t P
or I, σI |=t Q) iff (I ′, σI 6|= pi(P) or I, σI′ |=t
pi(Q)) iff (I ′, σI |= pi(P)7→pi(Q)) iff I ′, σI |=
pi(P ⊃ Q).
5. (∀x)P, x not safe: I, σI |=t (∀x)P iff
I, σI [x/d] |=t P for all d ∈ ∆ iff I ′, σI [x/d] |=
P for all d ∈ ∆ iff I ′, σI |= (∀x)P.
6. (∀x)P, x safe: I, σI |=t (∀x)P iff
I, σI [x/d] |=t P for all named d ∈ ∆ iff
I ′, σI [x/d] |= P for all named d ∈ ∆ iff
I ′, σI |= (∀x)P.
Proof of Proposition 59. Let KB be an ELP
rule base and P a well-formed formula of ELP.
KB |=ELP4 P iff pi(KB) |=ELP pi(P).
Proof. (LR) Suppose KB |=ELP4 P and let
I ′ be a model of pi(KB) and σI′ an assign-
ment for I ′. Assume wlog that I ′ is the primed-
counterpart of a 4-interpretation I. Since I ′ mod-
els pi(KB), I ′, σI′ |=ELP pi(KB). From Prop.
58, I, σI |=ELP4 KB and so I, σI |=ELP4 P.
From Prop. 58, I ′, σI′ |=ELP pi(P). (RL) Sup-
pose pi(KB) |=ELP pi(P) and let I 4-model KB
and let σI be an assignment for I. Let I ′ be the
primed-counterpart of I. Since I 4-satisfies KB,
I, σI |=ELP4 KB. From Prop. 58, I ′, σI′ |=ELP
pi(KB) and so I ′, σI′ |=ELP pi(P). From Prop. 58,
I, σI |=ELP4 P.
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